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STEAMROLLING SECTION 7(d) OF THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: HOW SUNK COSTS 
UNDERMINE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
Jeffrey S. Kopf* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Sunk costs significantly undermine the effectiveness of environ-
mental laws.! Sunk costs are a modern manifestation of the fait ac-
compli tactic-a time-proven strategy utilized by both private and 
public sector development coalitions to forestall the application of 
environmental laws that pose obstacles to their plans. 
The insidious effects of sunk costs are played out in this all too 
common scenario: The proponent of a project foresees that develop-
ment may violate some environmental laws, such as the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA).2 To avoid costly compliance with environmental 
* Managing Editor, 1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
The author would like to thank Professor Zygmunt J.B. Plater for his many valuable comments 
and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Comment. 
1 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE LAW 
AND SOCIETY 242-43 (Supp. 1994). Although the term "sunk costs" is found frequently in the 
context of cost accounting and economics, Professor Plater's textbook is one of the few sources 
to recognize the significance of sunk costs in the context of an environmental forum. See id.; see 
also JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 
102---{)4 (1971) (explaining the strategy of public agencies and private developers to invest time, 
effort, and money into projects to make opposition to projects more difficult). Although there 
is much case law involving the issues surrounding sunk costs in environmental contexts, only 
one case has referred specifically to such issues as "sunk costs." See Wade v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 
1100, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Eagle Foundation Inc. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 810 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (discussing whether construction costs which were incurred prior to completion of 
proper environmental evaluation of project should be considered during re-evaluation of the 
project). 
2 Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994). 
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regulations and to increase the likelihood that the proposed project 
will survive, the developer employs a well-established, devious, and 
still effective strategy-sinking money and resources into early and 
tangential phases of the project. In addition to massive investment, 
the early work drastically affects the environment and natural re-
sources-the very resources that should have been protected until 
more thorough analysis of the project's impact on the environment 
was conducted. By the time opponents of the project can get a court 
to consider enjoining the project, the court faces afait accompli. Much 
damage to the environment already has been done; massive resources 
already have been sunk into the project. The public has had little, if 
any, input regarding the effects of the project on the local community; 
however, the court faces tremendous practical pressure not to enforce 
environmental laws because doing so would effect a short-term waste 
of resources. 
The Tellico Dam-endangered species controversy illustrated the 
problem of sunk costs to Congress.3 Upon being informed of the 
discovery of an endangered species in the Little Tennessee River, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) rushed construction of a minor 
dam-a dam that destroyed a vast area of ecological and cultural 
resources while achieving admittedly insignificant benefits in naviga-
tion, flood control, and power generation.4 Although the Supreme 
Court enforced the ESA and enjoined the project/ the TVA, pointing 
to the costs that had already been sunk into the project, ultimately 
convinced Congress to authorize the completion of a dam that all 
analysts agreed should never have been started.6 
3 See MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT 324--30 (1986) (describing the controversy sur-
rounding the Tellico Dam); see also Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Reflected in a River: Agency Account-
ability and the TVA Tellico Dam Case, 49 TENN. L. REV. 747, 749--62 (1982) (providing excellent 
details of the Tellico Dam incident) [hereinafter Plater, Reflected in a River]. 
4 See Plater, Reflected in a River, supra note 3, at 750; see also REISNER, supra note 3, at 325; 
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A COURSEBOOK ON 
NATURE LAW AND SOCIETY 661 (1992) [hereinafter PLATER ET. AL., NLS] (noting Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA) worked triple shifts, night and day, in its attempt to make the Tellico 
dam controversy moot, before an injunction could be issued enjoining construction on the dam). 
An agent of the TVA informed counsel for the plaintiffs that it was the intention of the TVA 
that not a single tree would be left standing in the valley by the time the case went to court. 
Interview with Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Counsel for Plaintiffs in Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill, in Newton, MA (Mar. 23,1995). 
5 Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) [hereinafter TVA]. 
6 Advocates of the dam circumvented the injunction by attaching a rider to the Energy and 
Water Development Appropriation Act of 1980, exempting the Tellico dam from "all laws" 
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In the wake of the Tellico controversy, Congress responded by 
implementing § 7(d) of the ESA.7 Section 7(d) explicitly precludes 
agencies from making "irreversible or irretrievable" commitments of 
resources to projects that have the effect of precluding alternative 
design plans or strategies until consultation under § 7(a)(2) of the 
ESA is complete.8 
This Comment explores how, despite the passage of § 7(d), the sunk 
cost strategy remains powerful and effective. Section II of this Com-
ment discusses legislative responses to the dangers of sunk costs. 
Section III of this Comment considers common arguments used to 
circumvent statutory prohibitions against sunk costs. Section IV of 
this Comment examines the implicit consideration given the sunk cost 
tactic by judicial opinions. This Comment concludes with section V, 
which demonstrates the insidious effects of sunk costs. 
prohibiting its completion. See Pub. L. No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 449 (1979). This amendment is known 
as the "Duncan Amendment," so-named because it was introduced by Tennessee Representative 
John Duncan. See Peter Goplerud III, The Endangered Species Act: Does It Jeopardize the 
Continued Existence of Species?, 3 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 487, 507 n.147 (1979); see also 125 CONGo REC. 
18,936-37 (1979) ("explaining our frustration at the highly irregular nature of the Duncan 
amendment") (letter from Rep. John Breaux, chair of the House Subcommittee on Fisheries 
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment). For an excellent discussion of the Duncan 
Amendment, as well as examples of congressional exemptions from other environrr:entallaws, 
see Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the Laws: Congres-
sional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
435, 441-44 (1991). It is unlikely that such a rider would have passed if not for the fact that the 
dam was nearly complete. See Plater, RefWcted in a River, supra note 3, at 763. Representative 
Duncan admitted before Congress that, "I would not be here today asking that the Tellico be 
exempted, if it was not now nearing completion, but, ... it is 99 percent complete." 124 CONGo 
REC. 38,148 (1978), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
OF 1973, As AMENDED IN 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, AND 1980, at 863 (1982) [hereinafter LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY]. Representative John Dingell vehemently opposed the Duncan Amendment, 
stating: 
[the Tellico Dam] is a proposal where we have what was at the time of the construction 
an outlaw agency which arrogantly, flagrantly, and vigorously disregarded what they 
knew to be the clear thrust of the law .... What has happened is that TVA, with its 
usual bureaucratic use of public funds, has now wormed itself into a position where it 
has a project that now has public acceptance. 
124 CONGo REC. 38,149 (1978) reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 865-66. 
7 See discussion infra notes 9-13. 
8 ESA § 7(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d). Section 7(d) states: 
Id. 
[a]fter initiation of consultation required under subsection (a)(2) of this section, the 
Federal agency and the permit or license applicant shall not make any irreversible or 
irretrievable commitment of resources with respect to the agency action which has the 
effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent 
alternative measures which would not violate subsection (a)(2) of this section. 
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II. LEGISLATION DESIGNED TO PREVENT SUNK COSTS 
A. The Purpose and Legislative History of the 
1978 Amendments to the ESA 
Section 7(d) was added to the ESA as a result of the controversy 
surrounding the Tellico Dam.9 Advocates of the dam, distraught over 
the fact that a three-inch fish temporarily had stopped the construc-
tion of a multi-million dollar dam, as well as those who supported the 
ESA, agreed that the survival of the ESA depended upon making the 
law more flexible.lO Towards this end, Congress added two important 
provisions to the ESA-§ 7(d) and § 7(h)Y The first addition, § 7(d), 
is a preventative measure designed to preserve the status quo of a 
project until the project's impact on an endangered species is evalu-
ated thoroughly.12 The second addition to the ESA, § 7(h), adds an 
exemption procedure that would allow a project to proceed in spite of 
a violation of the ESA.13 
1. Section 7(d): The Preclusion of Sunk Costs 
In passing § 7(d), Congress hoped to preclude agencies from using 
the sunk cost tactic to steamroll projects to completion.14 Congress 
9 See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 356 (D.D.C.) (attributing 1978 amend-
ments to the ESA to the Tellico Dam controversy), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 
(D.C. Cir. 1980). 
10 See Andrus, 486 F. Supp. at 355 n.79 (stating Congress made ESA more flexible after TVA); 
H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 UNITED STATES CODE 
CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS 9453 [hereinafter U.S.C.C.A.N.] (stating pur-
pose of amending ESA was to make Act more flexible); Holly Doremus, Patching the Ark: 
Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 299 (1991) (noting 
many supporters of the ESA favored amending the ESA, fearing that failing to make it more 
flexible would lead to its repeal). 
11 ESA § 7(h), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h). The provisions explaining the exemption process under the 
ESA actually comprise ESA §§ 7(e)-(o), 16 U.S.C §§ 1536(e)-(o). Since § 7(h) contains the specific 
factors required to gain an exemption from the Endangered Species Committee (Committee), 
this Comment will refer to § 7(h) as the embodiment of the exemption process. 
12 See supra note 8 (containing text of § 7(d»; see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.09 (1994) (regulations 
implemented under § 7(d». 
13 ESA § 7(h), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h). 
14 See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF. 
REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2557, 2577 ("The 
conferees do not believe that any Federal agency or permittee should make any irreversible or 
irretrievable commitments of resources for the purpose or with the intent of foreclosing other-
wise reasonable alternatives . . . ."); see also Sierra Club v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 356 
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derived the amendment from a regulation first issued by the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) which stated that "[u]ntil consultation has been completed and 
a biological opinion issued, good faith consultation shall preclude a Fed-
eral agency from making an irreversible or irretrievable commitment 
of resources which would foreclose the consideration of modifications 
or alternatives to the identified activity or program."15 The NMFS and 
FWS explained the purpose of this regulation when it was implemented: 
The consultation process becomes a sham . . . if an agency can 
make irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
during consultation which foreclose the adoption of the very al-
ternatives being discussed. Such a commitment could easily lead 
to the waste of millions of dollars if the activity or program is 
subsequently enjoined for noncompliance with section 7. This is 
especially true in light of the ruling in Hill v. TV A, that even 
substantially completed projects are not immune from the re-
quirements of section 7 .... The [NMFS and FWS] are confident 
that Federal agencies will recognize that this adopted language is 
a logical extension of the obligation to consult in good faith. 16 
Before adopting § 7(d), Congress became fully aware of the FWS 
regulation and its implications due to an injunction issued by the 
United States District Court for the District of Nebraska in Ne-
braska v. Rural Electrification Administration [hereinafter Nebraska 
v. REA]P In that case, the court interpreted the regulation as pro-
viding broad protection of endangered and threatened species. IS The 
House Report accompanying the bill that ultimately became § 7(d) 
concluded: 
(D.D.C.) ("Congress enacted § 7(d) to prevent Federal agencies from 'steamrolling' activity in 
order to secure completion of projects regardless of their impact on endangered species."), aff'd 
in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species 
Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup Look From a Litigator's Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 
552 (1991) (noting that the purpose of § 7(d) is to defuse the administrative and economic 
momentum that could occur if a proposed action is going forward while § 7 consultation is 
occurring). 
15 50 C.F.R. § 402.04(a)(3) (1978). 
16 43 FED. REG. 870, 872-73 (Jan. 4,1978) (Final Regulation regarding interagency coopera-
tion) (citation omitted). 
17 Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Admin., 12 ERC 1156, 1170 (D. Neb. 1978) [hereinafter 
Nebraska v. REAl. 
18 See id.; see also 124 CONGo REC. 38,141-47 (1978), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 6, at 846-60 (showing Congress's discussion of Nebraska V. REA). For a thorough 
discussion of Nebraska v. REA see infra notes 44-54 and accompanying text. 
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[t]he new section 7(c)(4)19 of the act would further strengthen the 
consultation process. It prohibits any Federal agency from mak-
ing any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources 
once consultation has been initiated if such commitment would 
have the effect of foreclosing efforts to avoid the adverse impacts 
on the species or their critical habitat.20 
Senator John Culver of Iowa, the subcommittee Chairman who helped 
develop the compromise bill that evolved into § 7(d), recognized the 
need for a provision like § 7(d) to force agencies to consider the effects 
of projects on endangered species before investing in these projects.21 
Senator Culver recognized that a project with momentum cuts off 
alternatives and that such actions could harm endangered species.22 
Examination of the reports and debates accompanying the passage of 
§ 7(d) supports the conclusion that Congress's purpose in passing 
§ 7(d) was to prevent the sunk cost strategy from creating future 
Tellico scenarios.23 
19 The precursor of § 7(d) appeared as § 7(c)(4) when House Bill 14104 was introduced. See 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 671. The Senate bill contained no similar provision. See 
id. at 905-17. 
20 H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 10, at 20, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
6, at 744 (footnote added). 
21 See 124 CONGo REC. 21,347 (1978). Senator Culver stated: 
[ w Je are saying that when you designate an endangered species, you have to quit 
pouring the concrete at that very moment. We do not have that leverage under the 
current law. That was the problem with the old law: they said "endangered species," 
and started working overtime, to go from 30 percent completed up to $100 million, so 
no one could come in and say this 3-inch snail darter could stop that $117 million project. 
[d. Senator Culver's recognition of the dangers of sunk costs is also supported by his comments 
during debate over the "Nelson Amendment" which would have allowed the Endangered 
Species Committee to review only those projects which were substantially completed when a 
conflict between an endangered species and a project was discovered. 124 CONGo REC. 21,578 
(1978). Senator Culver noted that the Nelson Amendment, 
[d. 
will in my judgment have the effect of discouraging agencies from undertaking a sound 
biological inventory early in the project's stages, and it may also have the effect of 
deterring any real inclination to engage in good faith discussions and negotiations early 
in the planning stage .... This amendment says the only way you can have any hope 
for receiving an exemption is to get out there and build; then the damage is done. I 
thought this act was to preserve and protect the integrity of the environment. What 
do we want to say, "Just unleash the bulldozers and build, build, build so you can go in 
for an exemption .... " 
22 See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 351 (D.D.C. 1979) (quoting Senator 
Culver in 124 CONGo REC. S1O,896 (daily ed. July 17, 1978)) ("The earlier in the progress of a 
project a conflict [between a species and a projectJ is recognized, the easier it is to design an 
alternative consistent with the requirements of the act, or to abandon the proposed action."). 
23 See supra notes 17-22. 
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2. Section 7(h): The Exemption Process Under the ESA 
When amending the ESA in 1978, Congress recognized that, in 
some situations, exemption from the ESA might be appropriate.24 
Consequently, Congress created an Endangered Species Committee 
(Committee), whose duty was to grant exemptions from the require-
ments of § 7(a)(2) of the ESA.25 Congress, however, specifically enu-
merated the factors that would support an exemption.26 The sole 
authority to grant exemptions lies with the Committee, thereby pre-
cluding courts from usurping this role.27 Furthermore, reflecting Con-
gress's intent that sunk costs not be used to steamroll projects to 
completion, the use of sunk costs to obtain an exemption was spe-
cifically forbidden by § 7(h).28 Thus, § 7(h) represents Congress's un-
ambiguous mandate that exemptions only be granted from the ESA 
by the Committee when specifically enumerated factors are satisfied. 
B. Similar Prohibitive Purposes of Other Environmental Statutes 
Aside from the ESA, other environmental statutes also prohibit the 
use of the sunk cost tactic. In addition, case law interpreting the sunk 
cost prohibitions in these other statutes is more thoroughly developed 
24 For example, one project receiving an exemption from the ESA was the Greyrocks dam 
project, in which mitigative measures were taken to reduce the adverse effects of the dam on 
endangered whooping cranes. See infra note 54. 
25 ESA § 7(e), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (creating the Endangered Species Committee comprised of 
seven members including: the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Army, the Chair-
man of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the Secretary of the Interior, the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration, and an individual appointed by the President from the affected state). 
This Committee has been dubbed the "God Squad," as the Committee's decisions could result 
in the extinction of a species. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species Comm., 
984 F.2d 1534, 1536-37 (9th Cir. 1993); see also REISNER, supra note 3, at 327 (discussing "God 
Squad"). 
26 ESA §§ 7(h)(I)(A)(i-iv), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536 (h)(I)(A)(i-iv). The Committee may grant exemp-
tions from the protective provisions required under § 7(a)(2) where no "reasonable or prudent" 
alternatives exist to the agency action, where the benefits of pursuing a project "clearly 
outweigh" any other course of action, or where the project is of regional or national significance. 
[d.; see also MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 370-73 (1983) 
(discussing exemption process); George C. Coggins & Irma S. Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail 
Darters in Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1433, 
1480-95 (1982) (discussing the duties of the Endangered Species Committee in detail). 
27 ESA § 7(e)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(2). 
28 ESA § 7(h)(1)(A)(iv), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(I)(A)(iv) (stating as a prerequisite to obtaining an 
exemption under § 7(h) that "neither the Federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant 
made any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources prohibited by subsection (d) of 
this section"). 
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than case law under § 7(d) of the ESA. Therefore, some consideration 
of these statutes and cases will be informative to an assessment of 
sunk costs in the ESA context. 
1. Preclusion of Sunk Costs in the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) 
Congress promulgated NEPA29 to ensure that federal projects were 
not initiated until an accurate assessment of the project's impact on 
the environment was complete.30 To achieve this purpose, § 102(2)(C) 
of NEPA requires that federal agencies complete a detailed statement 
of environmental consequences-an environmental impact statement 
(EIS)-prior to initiation of any project that is likely to "significantly 
affect[] the quality of the environment."31 Regulations issued pursuant 
to NEPA state that "[u]ntil an agency issues a record of decision ... 
no action concerning the proposal shall be taken which would: (1) 
[h]ave an adverse environmental impact; or (2) [l]imit the choice of 
reasonable alternatives."32 This language in NEPA is similar to the 
language of § 7(d) of the ESA, which also precludes commitments of 
resources that would foreclose the formulation or implementation of 
any reasonable and prudent alternative measures.33 Because of the 
similar purposes of § 102(2)(C) of NEPA, and § 7(d) of the ESA, an 
29 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
30 See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (finding Congress passed NEPA to ensure that federal agencies 
consider the environmental consequences of proposed actions during the decision-making proc-
ess, thereby insuring "fully informed and well-considered" decisions); Massachusetts v. Watt, 
716 F.2d 946, 953 (1st Cir. 1983) ("[NEPA's] purpose is to require consideration of environmental 
factors before project momentum is irresistible, before options are closed, and before agency 
commitments are set in concrete." (quoting W. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.7 at 767 
(1977»); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1333 (4th Cir.) (stating that the 
"purpose of NEPA [is] to insure that actions by federal agencies be taken with due consideration 
of environmental effects"), cert. denied sub nom. Fugate v. Arlington Coalition on Transp., 409 
U.S. 1000 (1972). 
31 NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 
32 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1 (1995); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (stating that agencies must "integrate 
the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and 
decisions reflect environmental values ... and to head off potential conflicts"). These regulations 
reflect the realization that the earlier in the planning stages a project is scrutinized the easier 
it is to modify the project in the interest of the environment. See id.; see also Leslye Herrmann, 
Injunctionsfar NEPA Violations: Balancing the Equities, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1268 (1992) 
(explaining that "early preparation of an EIS ensures that the EIS serves as an important 
contribution to the decision-making process rather than a post-hoc rationalization of decisions 
already made"). 
33 ESA § 7(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d). 
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analysis of judicial interpretations of NEPA to particular situations 
involving sunk costs will be helpful to understanding how courts 
should apply § 7(d). This analysis appears below in section III of this 
Comment. 
2. Preclusion of Sunk Costs in § 4(f) of the 
Department of Transportation Act 
Another group of cases that are helpful to understanding the insidi-
ous effects of sunk costs involves violations of the Parklands Act, 
more commonly referred to as "Section 4(f)" of the Department of 
Transportation Act.34 During the mid 1960's Congress passed § 4(f) to 
slow down the conversion of parklands to roads.35 Section 4(f) pro-
vided that the Secretary of Transportation should not approve any 
project which required the use of any publicly owned land from a 
public park, "unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to 
the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible plan-
ning to minimize harm to such park ... resulting from such use."36 
Thus, § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, like § 102(2)(c) 
of NEPA, and § 7(d) of the ESA call for consideration of the impacts 
of federal action on various aspects of the environment before federal 
action is taken.37 Looking at cases rejecting the use of sunk costs 
under § 4(f) will be helpful in understanding why courts should reject 
the use of sunk costs in the context of § 7(d). Cases interpreting the 
applicability of § 4(f) are analyzed below in section III of this Comment. 
III. ARGUMENTS USED TO CIRCUMVENT THE 
PROHIBITION AGAINST SUNK COSTS 
Federal agencies, states, and private parties generally advance 
three types of arguments to circumvent the protective provisions of 
the ESA. Agencies and non-agency actors with an interest in a project 
know that a project in progress is more difficult to stop than a project 
34 Department of Transportation Act of 1966 § 4(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976) (repealed by 
Pub. L. 97-449, § 7(b), Jan. 12, 1983,96 Stat. 2444). An almost identical provision, however, is 
retained in the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1994). For the purposes of simplicity, 
"§ 4(f)" will be used to refer to either of these identical provisions. 
35 See PLATER ET AL., NLS, supra note 4, at 559. The reason for this conversion was that 
parklands were much cheaper to acquire than private property and thus were attractive to 
federal agencies such as the Department of Transportation (DOT). See id. 
36 23 U.S.C. § 138; 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976). 
37 See id. 
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with a mere approval on paper.38 As a result, agencies and interested 
parties desire to get projects initiated as quickly as possible. To achieve 
this goal, agencies have devised numerous arguments that allow them 
to circumvent the intent of § 7(d) of the ESA. This Comment divides 
these arguments into three general categories. First, agencies may 
make the "not irreversible" argument, claiming that because parts of 
projects potentially can be undone, the projects do not represent 
irreversible commitments of resources and thus do not violate § 7(d).39 
Second, agencies may make the "segmentation" argument, urging the 
courts to view federal projects as individual segments that should be 
evaluated and approved individually, because none of the segments 
alone cause significant impacts.4o The third approach consists of argu-
ing that unless plaintiffs can show the "bad faith" of the agencies-
that is, unless plaintiffs prove that agencies specifically committed 
resources in order to circumvent an environmental regulation-then 
the sunk costs should be allowed.41 Unlike the first two approaches in 
which the defendant merely argues that § 7(d) does not apply, the 
"bad faith" argument asserts that § 7(d) should be ignored outright. 
If accepted, anyone of these arguments would undermine the legis-
lative intent of § 7(d) of the ESA.42 
A. Avoiding § 7( d) by Denying Sufficient 
Commitment of Resources 
Agencies whose activities draw challenge under § 7(d) frequently 
argue that their actions are not "irreversible or irretrievable" be-
cause, theoretically, the actions can be undone or altered.43 Agencies 
38 See, e.g., Herrmann, supra note 32, at 1289 ("If an agency has been allowed to spend more 
resources on the project it is more likely to go forward with the previously selected options so 
as not to waste its investment."). 
39 See, e.g., Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F. Supp. 102, 112 n.24 (D. Mass. 1993) (accepting 
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority's argument that investment of over $100 million was 
not ''irreversible or irretrievable" because the project design could be altered if evidence 
revealed the right whale would be harmed by the project); see also discussion infra Section 
lILA. 
40 See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1452-57 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing why oil and 
gas leases cannot be issued prior to considering effects of mineral exploration and extraction on 
endangered species), cert. denied sub nom. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Lujan, 489 U.S. 1012 
(1989); see also discussion infra Section IILB. 
41 See, e.g., Eagle Foundation, Inc. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 809 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that sunk 
costs be allowed unless intentionally incurred as an effort to give a preferred project design an 
advantage over other designs); see also discussion infra Section IILC. 
42 See supra Section II.A.!' 
4a See id. 
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make similar arguments when challenged under NEPA. Essentially, 
both arguments claim that insufficient resources have been commit-
ted to projects to invoke the prohibition of these environmental laws 
because the work already done could be undone. 
1. Application of the Irreversible and Irretrievable 
Standard Under the ESA 
One of the earliest cases interpreting the preclusion against "irre-
versible and irretrievable" commitments of resources was Nebraska 
v. REA.44 Although Congress had not adopted § 7(d) at the time of 
this case, the FWS had implemented regulations under § 7 that pre-
cluded irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources-the 
same regulation from which the language of § 7(d) was adopted.45 The 
plaintiffs in Nebraska v. REA challenged the decision of the Rural 
Electrification Administration (REA) to make certain commitments 
and loan guarantees to the sponsors of the Missouri Basin Power 
Project before the REA had entered into consultation with the FWS 
regarding the impact of the project on endangered whooping cranes.46 
The plaintiffs also challenged the Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) 
issuance of a federal permit necessary for the construction of the 
Grayrocks Dam, a portion of the project.47 
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska found 
that the commitments made by REA and the Corps to the project 
violated the FWS regulations prohibiting irreversible and irretriev-
able commitments of resources.48 The court found that, although the 
FWS requested that the REA initiate formal consultation under § 7 
of the ESA regarding the impact of the project on endangered whooping 
cranes, the formal consultation had not occurred.49 The court therefore 
inquired as to whether the loan guarantees made to sponsors of the 
project by REA violated the FWS regulations precluding irreversible 
or irretrievable commitments of resources.50 The court rejected de-
fendants' arguments that the regulation only precluded direct disrup-
tion of the whooping crane's critical habitat and that therefore loan 
44 Nebraska v. REA, 12 ERG 1156, 1170 (D. Neb. 1978). 
45 See id. at 1170; see also supra note 15 (describing legislative history of § 7(d». 
46 Nebraska v. REA, 12 ERG at 1157. 
47 [d. 
48 [d. at 1170-72. 
49 [d. at 1170. 
50 [d. at 1172. 
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guarantees were not covered by the regulation.51 Instead, the court 
recognized the pressure for completion that the investment would 
create.52 Thus, applying the FWS regulations, the court enjoined REA 
from making loan guarantees to sponsors of the project.53 The court 
similarly considered the issuance of the permit by the Corps to be an 
irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources which was 
precluded until the issuance of a biological opinion.54 
In contrast to the realistic interpretation of an "irreversible and 
irretrievable" commitment of resources in NelYraska v. REA, the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reached 
a different interpretation in Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner.55 Before 
Bays' Legal Fund came to court, the plaintiffs before the same court 
had demanded an end to sewage discharge in Boston Harbor, and the 
court had ordered a stop to the dumping.56 Subsequently, Massachu-
setts state legislators created the Massachusetts Water Resources 
Authority (MWRA) to oversee construction of a new sewage treat-
ment facility, including a sewage treatment tunnel that extended into 
Massachusetts Bay.57 After governmental actors had invested $148 
million in design and construction of the tunnel, environmental organi-
zations sued, claiming violations of the ESA and NEPA.58 At the time 
61 See Nebraska v. REA, 12 ERC at 1172 ("The making of the commitments by REA and 
allowing construction to begin amount to the kind of commitment which, as a practical matter, 
forecloses consideration of the kinds of modifications or alternatives to the Project that would 
avoid endangering the whooping cranes."). 
52 [d. The court agreed with the testimony of the regional director of the FWS: 
I believe that the investment of building the dam and the power plant and associated 
structures and the goods and services delivered from that investment would create 
pressures to continue the operation of the project in the face of information that it 
might be detrimental. 
[d. at 1172. (quoting Harvey Willoughby, regional director of the FWS). 
53 [d. at 1181. 
64 See id. at 1173. The regional FWS director's warning of the risks of sunk costs with respect 
to the Greyrocks dam proved to be true. Faced with the indisputable evidence that completion 
of the Greyrocks dam might threaten the continued existence of the whooping crane, the 
sponsors of the project obtained an exemption from the ESA through the Endangered Species 
Committee. See Species Panel Denies Exemption to Tellico Dam, But Exempts Grayrocks 
Dam, 9 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1776 (Jan. 26,1979). 
66 Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F. Supp. 102, 105 (D. Mass. 1993). 
56 See Andrew Savage, Comment, Boston Harbor: The Anatomy of a Court-Run Cleanup, 
22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 365, 370 (1995). 
57 See 1984 Mass. Acts 372, § 3(a) (creating Massachusetts Water Resources Authority); see 
also, David Doneski, Comment, Cleaning Up Boston Harbor: Fact or Fiction?, 12 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 559, 608 (1985) (describing circumstances surrounding cleanup of Boston Harbor); 
Savage, supra note 56, at 366, 378-79 (describing court oversight of Boston Harbor Cleanup). 
58 Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 112 n.22. 
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of the suit, the NMFS still had not issued the biological OpInIOn 
required at the conclusion of the consultation process under § 7(a)(2).59 
In fact, the NMFS had issued only a one-page response to the EPA, 
which preliminarily concluded that the project was not likely to ad-
versely affect endangered species.60 
In Bays' Legal Fund the plaintiffs asserted that the construction 
of the outfall tunnel violated § 7(d) of the ESA because consultation 
was incomplete.61 Continued construction of the outfall pipe, the plain-
tiffs argued, violated § 7(d) by foreclosing the development of ecologi-
cally safer discharge alternatives.62 In contrast, the defendants assured 
the court that the outfall tunnel could be incorporated into several 
alternative discharge approaches if subsequent information revealed 
that the project would harm endangered species.63 Relying on these 
assurances, the court allowed the outfall tunnel to continue unimpeded 
because the investment effectively had not foreclosed any options.64 
These two cases, Nebraska v. REA and Bays' Legal Fund, illus-
trate the divergent results that courts have reached when interpret-
ing the irreversible and irretrievable standard. Given the disparity in 
results under the ESA, reference to judicial interpretations of similar 
69 See id. at 107; see also Savage, supra note 56, at 399 (noting that at the time of litigation, 
the EPA had conducted a Biological Assessment concluding that the endangered species were 
"not likely to be adversely affected" by the toxins that the outfall would discharge into the 
Harbor). A biological assessment, however, is the step that precedes the issuance of a Biological 
Opinion. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.12. 
60 See Salley A. Williams, Comment, The Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner: Should the Courts 
Allow an Agency's Poor Timing to Imperil Endangered Species?, 1 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 
128, 133 (1994). 
61 Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 112. The factual situation in this case is similar to that 
of TV A-that is, a huge investment had been made, despite a violation of the ESA. A significant 
difference, however, between TVA and Bays' Legal Fund is that in TVA completion of the 
project was certain to destroy all the critical habitat of an endangered species, while in Bays' 
Legal Fund the effects of the project on the endangered species in the Bay was unknown. 
Compare Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 109, with TVA, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978). An article 
in the Boston Globe also noted the similarity between the two cases stating: 
[T]he right whale is not just an overgrown . . . snail darter standing in the way of 
progress; it is an endangered species highly symbolic of man's deliberate squandering 
of a common natural heritage. If the right whale cannot be protected, the chances for 
survival of other threatened creatures are not good. 
The Right Whale, The Right Protection, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 20, 1992 (Ed.), at 12 
62 Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 112. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 112 n.24.; see also Savage, supra note 56, at 400 (noting that Judge Mazzone implied 
that if new evidence arose that the outfall tunnel would harm the right whale "it will be 
appropriate to reconsider the wisdom, not to mention the legality" of the decision (quoting Bays' 
Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 109». 
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language under NEPA may be informative to a thorough analysis of 
ESA language. 
2. Application of the Irreparable Harm Standard Under NEPA 
Although different from the standard in § 7(d), NEPA's prohibition 
against actions that are likely to significantly affect the environment 
prior to an EIS, has the same goal of preventing premature commit-
ments to environmentally unsound projects.65 In determining whether 
NEPA has been violated by irreversible commitments of resources 
prior to the completion of a proper EIS, several NEPA cases revolve 
around whether such preliminary activities cause "irreparable" harm 
to the environment, thus warranting the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction.66 Courts confronted with this issue frequently discuss the 
dangers of sunk costs. Such discussions will be helpful in demonstrat-
ing how courts should respond to similar arguments in the context of 
the ESA.67 
Judge, now Supreme Court Justice, Breyer's reasoning in Sierra 
Club v. Marsh [hereinafter Sears Island] illustrates the dangers that 
sunk costs pose in the NEPA context.68 In Sears Island, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated a district court 
ruling denying a preliminary injunction to environmental plaintiffs.69 
The plaintiffs sought to prevent the construction of a causeway to an 
island that the State of Maine wanted to develop into a marine termi-
nal. 70 The United States District Court for the District of Maine in 
denying the preliminary injunction, reasoned that the harm to the 
environment was not ''irreparable'' because the causeway always could 
be removed at a later time.71 
60 See supra Section II.B.l. 
66 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500--01 (1st Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Sears 
Island]). Two unrelated cases in this Comment have identical party names-Sierra Club v. 
Marsh. For the purposes of clarity, in this Comment each case has been given a different 
designation. 
67 See supra notes 74-78. 
68 See Sears Island, 872 F.2d at 500. 
69 Id. at 505, on remand to, Sierra Club v. Marsh, 714 F. Supp. 539, 591 (D. Me.), supplemented 
and amended, 744 F. Supp. 352 (D. Me. 1989), aff'd, 976 F.2d 763 (1st Cir. 1992). 
70 Sears Island, 872 F.2d at 498; see also Herrmann, supra note 32, at 1286 (discussing Sears 
Island). 
71 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 701 F. Supp. 886, 898 (D. Me. 1988) ("In the absence of any evidence 
that removal of the causeway is either impracticable or that it would not substantially restore 
the environmental status quo, the court concluded that the plaintiffs have failed to make a 
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Judge Breyer vacated the district court's decision not to issue a 
preliminary injunction.72 Citing extensively from his reasoning in Mas-
sachusetts v. Watt73 , Judge Breyer reiterated that setting aside an 
agency's decision at a later date would not undo environmental harm.74 
Moreover, the commitment of resources already made to a project 
would influence any re-evaluation of the merits of the project.75 Judge 
Breyer pointed out that, "[i]t is far easier to influence an initial choice 
than to change a mind already made Up."76 Judge Breyer added that, 
"the harm at stake is a harm to the environment, but the harm 
consists of the added risk to the environment that takes place when 
governmental decision makers make up their minds without having 
before them an analysis (with prior public comment) of the likely 
effects of their decision upon the environment."77 Judge Breyer rec-
ognized the essence of the risk that sunk costs create-that prema-
ture decisions irreparably harm the environment by increasing the 
risk to the environment.78 This insight should also underpin § 7(d)'s 
preclusion of irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
until the consultation process is complete. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in North 
Carolina v. Virginia Beach was not as cognizant of the dangers of 
sunk costs as was the First Circuit in Sears Island.79 In Virginia 
Beach, the City of Virginia Beach wanted to begin constructing a 
pipeline between a man-made lake and the city before the Federal 
showing of irreparable environmental injury."), order vacated in part by Sears Island, 872 F.2d 
497 (lst Cir. 1989). 
72 See Sears Island, 872 F.2d at 505. 
73 See id. at 500 (citing Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952-53 (lst Cir. 1983». 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 499-500 (quoting Watt, 716 F.2d at 952-53). Along a similar line of reasoning, Judge 
Breyer further articulates, "NEPA's object is to minimize ... the risk of uninformed choice, a 
risk that arises in part from the practical fact that bureaucratic decision makers ... are less 
likely to tear down a nearly completed project than a barely started project." Id. at 500-01. 
77 Sears Island, 872 F.2d at 500. 
78 See id. at 500. On remand, the United States District Court for the District of Maine 
enjoined the construction on the project noting, "[w]ith the completion of each additional phase 
of construction, agency decision-makers may be more disposed to adhere to their earlier unin-
formed decision, rather than to entertain and fairly consider new information that might point 
to 'a new and different course of action.'" Sierra Club v. Marsh, 714 F. Supp. 539, 591 (D. Me.), 
supplemented and amended by 744 F. Supp. 352 (D. Me. 1989), aff'd, 976 F.2d 763 (1st Cir. 1992). 
The controversy surrounding the Sears Island Project has yet to be resolved. See Scott Allen, 
Foes of Cargo Port Stand Their Ground, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1995 (Metro/Region) at 33 
(reporting that EPA officials soon will decide whether to approve the project). 
79 See North Carolina v. Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d 596, 598 (4th Cir. 1991). 
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Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had approved the project.80 
The plaintiff, the State of North Carolina, argued that allowing Vir-
ginia Beach to proceed with construction, prior to FERC's approval 
of the project, would influence unfairly FERC's decision in favor of 
the project.81 The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of North Carolina agreed with the plaintiffs and held that, "the 
public interest in a FERC decision uninfluenced by the vast expendi-
tures of public funds and a partial completion of the project outweighs 
any anticipated delay. The public interest favors avoiding irreversible 
damage to the environment ... even though compliance with NEPA 
may result in delays and cost increases."82 The court, recognizing the 
irreparable harm that the sunk costs would cause to the environment, 
enjoined initiation of the project.83 
On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit concluded that an injunction was inappropriate in the 
case.84 The court found that because nothing in the record suggested 
that FERC would be "unduly influenced" by allowing Virginia Beach 
to proceed with a portion of the project, the project should be allowed 
to proceed.85 The court reasoned that FERC still might reject the 
project, especially because FERC explicitly assured that it would not 
allow Virginia Beach's investment of $8.4 million to influence its evalu-
ation of the project.86 Persuaded by this "protective barrier against 
80 See id. at 598. 
8! [d. at 601. 
82 [d. (quoting district court decision). The district court stated that, "federal regulatory 
agencies, such as FERC, should not be presented with public and political pressure brought on 
by partially completed projects in making important environmental decisions." [d. (quoting 
district court). 
83 See id. 
84 See Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d at 598. 
85 [d. at 602. The court also noted: 
the commencement of construction of two relatively small portions of the pipeline 
project outside FERC Project 2009 does not apply such public and political pressure 
on FERC that it will be unable rationally to discharge its statutorily imposed respon-
sibilities and that this construction will not interfere with FERC's responsibility in 
conducting an environmental review on other parts of the pipeline. 
[d. at 598. In reaching its conclusion to allow the construction to proceed, the Court of Appeals 
was especially impressed with FERC's assurances that: 
[any] applicant that takes steps to further an unapproved project of action and in the 
process endangers the environment and contravenes the purposes of NEPA, does so 
at its financial peril because the Commission may withhold or condition its approval. 
Any argument made by an applicant that its project should be approved because of 
prior expenditures of funds or resources would be disregarded by the Commission in 
making its decision on the merits of the proposal. 
[d. at 602. 
86 [d. 
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any potential political pressure that otherwise might exist," the ap-
pellate court lifted the district court's injunction on the project.87 
The contradictory conclusions reached in Nebraska v. REA and 
Bays'Legal Fund as well as Sears Island and Virginia Beach dem-
onstrate that the state of the law involving what constitutes an "irre-
versible and irretrievable" commitment of resources or "irreparable" 
harm is still unresolved. While agencies have achieved some success 
by arguing that early investment or construction is not an irreversible 
and irretrievable commitment, there are other means by which agen-
cies may circumvent § 7(d)'s prohibitions. 
B. Avoiding § 7( d) by Segmenting Projects Into Individual Parts 
Private parties as well as state and federal government agencies 
try to circumvent § 7(d) by seeking piece-meal approval for individual 
parts of a project. This strategy, called segmentation, works because 
when a project's pieces are viewed in isolation, the individual seg-
ments often do not appear to threaten an endangered species. Devel-
opers attempt to impose this narrow perspective on courts, and try 
to initiate portions of projects that later can be used to bootstrap the 
rest of the project to completion. Cases such as Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park v. Volpe [hereinafter Overton Park], however, have 
made courts cognizant of the dangers of sunk costs in the segmenta-
tion context.88 Consequently courts almost uniformly have rejected 
segmentation as a means of circumventing § 7(d). 
1. Segmentation Under the ESA 
There are two basic ways in which developers or agencies might 
try to segment projects into parts to avoid § 7(d) of the ESA.89 In one 
segmentation context, private developers attempt to convince an agency 
to approve parts of a project in stages, thereby allowing resources to 
87 [d. at 602-{)3. 
88 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 422 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). 
In Overton Park the DOT proceeded to condemn homes, to build two highway segments to the 
boundaries of the park, and to construct a multimillion dollar bridge across the Mississippi River 
on the Park highway alignment-all before asking the Secretary to approve the route through 
the park. See PLATER ET. AL., NLS, supra note 4, at 553 n.16. After years of litigation, the 
Secretary of Transportation admitted that completion of the road through the park would 
violate § 4(0. [d. at 556. In spite of the massive investment already sunk into the project, a court 
rejected the defendant's pleas to allow construction through the park to continue. See id. at 557 
n.23; see also, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1212, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 
1974), cert. denied sub nom. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Smith, 421 U.S. 991 (1975). 
89 See infra notes 92-116. 
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be invested prior to a comprehensive review of the effects of the 
entire project on endangered species.90 The other type of segmenta-
tion occurs when a developer attempts to segment a project into 
"nonfederal" and "federal" parts. By investing in early phases of the 
nonfederal parts of a project, a private developer presents the federal 
government with a fait accompli-leaving the federal government 
with no practical way to complete the project without doing sig-
nificant harm to the environment.91 Both of these strategies use sunk 
costs to build project momentum and to undermine the purpose of 
§ 7(d). 
In Conner v. Burford, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reinforced the notion that activities such as oil or min-
eral exploration cannot be segmented into parts for purposes of ESA 
§ 7 analysis.92 In Conner, the FWS approved oil and gas leases for 
several tracts of land in a national forest.93 The FWS concluded that 
the lease sales themselves were not likely to jeopardize endangered 
species, but admitted that the FWS had not evaluated the impact of 
post-leasing oil and gas exploration and extraction activities on pro-
tected species.94 Parties interested in obtaining the leases argued that 
since, by the terms of the leases, the federal government could pro-
hibit any activities that were likely to jeopardize protected species, 
mere approval of the leases posed no threat to wildlife.95 In other 
words, the companies argued that the lease sale was not an "irre-
versible or irretrievable" commitment of resources.96 The court re-
jected this reasoning based on the plain language of § 7(d) and § 7(a) 
of the ESA and required a comprehensive analysis of the impact of 
post-leasing oil and gas activities on endangered species, prior to the 
lease sales.97 
90 See infra notes 92-107. 
91 See infra notes 108-16; see also supra note 88 (discussing Overton Park). 
92 See Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Sun 
Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Lujan, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989). 
93Id. 
94 Id. at 1455. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. 
97 Conner, 848 F.2d at 1455 n.34. But see Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States 
Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 620-24 (lOth Cir. 1987) (upholding BLM's decision that agency 
action under review was merely the lease sale itself in context of challenge under NEPA); see 
also Kilbourne, supra note 14, at 550 (discussing contrary conclusions reached by courts in 
Conner v. Burford and Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United States Department of 
Agriculture). 
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Unlike the Conner court, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit in North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 
was not as cognizant of the dangers of sunk costS.98 Andrus involved 
the development of oil lands in the Beauford Sea off the coast of 
Alaska.99 The plaintiffs, fearing that oil development would threaten 
several endangered whales, sought to enjoin the Secretary of Interior 
from entering into lease agreements with several oil companies.loo The 
plaintiffs claimed that § 7(d) of the ESA required a comprehensive 
assessment of the effects of oil exploration and extraction on endan-
gered species before the federal government could issue leases for 
those activities.1Ol The United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia agreed, noting: 
[a] massive amount of resources must be invested to facilitate 
exploration. Given the Tellico Dam experience, the investment of 
a massive amount of resources before the safety of an endangered 
species is insured is precisely what Congress intended to preclude 
with the enactment of § 7(d). Plaintiffs have made a substantial 
showing that the lease sale in question would violate § 7(d) ofthe 
ESA.102 
On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit ultimately allowed the leases to be ap-
proved in stages.103 The court's reasoning relied on the unique statu-
tory provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act (OC-
SLA).l04 That statute required stage-by-stage review of the oil leasing 
and exploration process and allowed for the Secretary to approve 
individual segments of the oil exploration process if review of the 
effects of the entire project on the environment were completed be-
fore any individual segment was approved.lo5 In concluding that the 
lease sales were not "irreversible or irretrievable" commitments of 
98 See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
99 See id. at 592-93. 
100 North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326, 328-29 (D.D.C. 1979). 
101 [d. at 329-30. 
102 [d. Although the court agreed with this aspect of the plaintiffs' claims the court was 
persuaded that the economic interests of Alaska were significant enough to deny the issuance 
of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs at that stage of the case. [d. at 331. However, one 
month later, after reconsideration of the case for different ESA and NEPA violations, the court 
enjoined the leases. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 364 (D.D.C.), aff'd 
in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
103 Andrus, 642 F.2d at 611. 
104 Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (1988). 
105 Andrus, 642 F.2d at 608-09. 
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resources, the court further noted that the oil companies were willing 
to risk the loss of their investment during the leasing stage if the 
Secretary ever chose to revoke the leases.loo The court in Andrus did 
not suggest that an incremental step approach is warranted under the 
ESA, but merely recognized the unique situation raised in Andrus 
because of the statutory construction of OCSLA.107 
A final example of an attempt to segment a project into individual 
phases occurred in Sierra Club v. Marsh [hereinafter Califarnia Least 
Tern].I08 In California Least Tern, the Corps planned to obtain land 
adjacent to a wetlands to mitigate the detrimental effects of a pro-
posed road on several species of endangered birds that nested in the 
area.109 Because the Corps was delayed in obtaining the land neces-
sary for mitigation, plaintiffs sued to enjoin the project until the 
mitigation plans were implemented.110 The Corps argued that the 
court should not stop the entire project because the Corps would 
likely obtain the necessary land.111 However, by applying the princi-
ples behind § 7(d),112 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit noted that the project would require significant modification 
if the Corps failed to obtain the land and that "the risk that the 
[Corps] might not prevail must be borne by the project, not by the 
endangered species."113 Not only did the court enjoin all work on the 
side of the highway where the birds nested, the court also ordered 
106 Id. at 611. 
107 Id. at 608-11; see also Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1455-56 (9th Cir. 1988) (analyzing 
Andrus); Kilbourne, supra note 14, at 548-49 (discussing how Conner is different from Andrus 
in that Conner concerns the Mineral Land Leasing Act (MLA), which did not contain the same 
segmented system of "checks and balances" as OCSLA and thus warranted a different conclu-
sion). 
lOB Califarnia Least Tern, 816 F.2d 1376, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1987). 
109 Id. 
uo Id. at 1381. A change in circumstances often requires an agency to reinitiate formal 
consultation. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16. Section 402.16(b) states: 
[r ]einitiation of formal consultation is required and shall be requested by the Federal 
agency or by the Service, where discretionary Federal involvement or control over the 
action has been retained or is authorized by law and .... (b) If new information reveals 
effects of the action that may affect listed species or critical habitat in a manner or to 
an extent not previously considered. 
Id. § 402.16(b); see also John W. Steiger, The Consultation Provision of Section 7(A)(2) of the 
Endangered Species Act and Its Application to Delegable Federal Programs, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
243, 255 n.64 (1994) (noting several cases involving obligation to reinitiate consultation); Deborah 
Freeman, Reinitiation of ESA § 7 Consultations Over Existing Projects, 8 NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV'T. 17 (1993) (discussing reinitiation process under the ESA § 7(a)). 
III Califarnia Least Tern, 816 F.2d at 1385. 
U2 See id. at 1389 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1978) 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 10, at 9484, 9486. 
U3 Califarnia Least Tern, 816 F.2d at 1386. 
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the state workers on the other side of the highway to stop work as 
wellY4 The court recognized that investment in construction on one 
side of the highway could preclude alternatives on the otherY5 The 
court issued an injunction, ordering the Corps to reinitiate consult-
ation with the Secretary and specifically noted that the prohibitions 
against "any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources" 
applied during the consultation process.1l6 
Case law under the ESA involving segmentation generally rejects 
such arguments.l17 These cases, however, offer far from a resounding 
rejection of sunk costs. Thus, judicial application of § 7(d) could be 
improved by reference to analysis under other laws with similar 
purposes such as NEPA and § 4(f) of the Department of Transporta-
tion Act, in which segmentation has been rejected more firmly. 
2. Segmentation Under NEPA and § 4(f) of the 
Department of Transportation Act 
Project proponents using the sunk cost strategy often come into 
conflict with NEPA and § 4(f). Generally, case law applying NEPA 
and § 4(f) to sunk cost problems firmly denies effect to the sunk cost 
strategy. The reasoning behind these cases could help minimize incon-
sistent and ineffective implementation of §7 (d) of the ESA. 
A situation strikingly similar to Overton Park1l8 occurred in Named 
Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas 
Highway Department [hereinafter San Antonio Conservation Soci-
114 [d. at 1378, 1389 ("The institutionalized caution mandated by section 7 of the ESA requires 
the COE to halt all construction that may adversely affect the habitat until it insures the 
acquisition of the mitigation lands or modifies the project accordingly."). Members of Congress 
recognized the broad reach of the ESA during debate of the 1978 Amendments to the ESA. See 
Steiger, supra note 110, at 271. For instance, Senator Stennis, during the floor debate of the 
1978 Amendments to the ESA stated: 
[net me emphasize, so that we do not lose sight of it, that this law and its potential 
impact is not limited to Federal projects. It applies to any project, Federal, State, 
municipal, or private, which is supported by Federal funds, including, permitting or 
otherwise. The scope of the reach of the law must be recognized before its potential 
impact is fully understood. 
As the law now stands, any Federal project, or any project involving Federal action, 
even though it involved the highest national interest, could be stopped cold if it 
impacted on the most insignificant, most obscure and most worthless plant or verte-
brate. 
124 CONGo REC. 21,146 (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 992. 
115 California Least Tern, 816 F.2d at 1389. 
116 [d. (explicitly relying on § 7(d) to justify injunction until consultation is complete). 
117 See supra notes 92-97, 108-16. 
118 See supra note 88 (discussing Overton Park). 
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ety].119 State and federal defendants sought to build the two end 
segments of a highway prior to complying with NEPA and § 4(f).120 
The defendants justified their action by claiming that § 4(f) was not 
yet applicable because the end segments actually did not go through 
the park.121 
In rejecting the defendants' arguments, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that adopting the defendant's 
narrow view of the applicability of § 4(f) would undermine Congress's 
intent in passing the statute.122 The court adamantly refused to view 
the project as discrete segments and criticized the tactics of the 
Secretary.123 The court stated that "[t]he Secretary's approach to his 
section 4(f) responsibilities thus makes a joke of the 'feasible and 
prudent alternatives' standard, and we not only decline to give such 
an approach our imprimatur, we specifically declare it unlawful."124 
Another clever strategy used to evade federal environmental regu-
lation and incur sunk costs is to mask federal projects as state or 
119 Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 
446 F.2d 1013, 1014 (5th Cir. 1971) [hereinafter San Antonio Conservation Soc'yl. 
120 See San Antonio Conservation Soc'y, 446 F.2d at 1017. 
121 [d. at 1022. 
122 [d. at 1023. The court noted that "[tlhe frustrating effect such piecemeal administrative 
approvals would have on the vitality of section 4(f) is plain for any man to see." [d. 
123 See id. 
124 [d. (emphasis added). Many courts have rejected allowing highway projects to be seg-
mented into parts. See, e.g., Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y 
v. Texas Highway Dep't, 400 U.S. 968, 97()""71 (1970). In this case the Supreme Court stated: 
it is simply not realistic to consider the construction of this expressway "section by 
section" as the District Court and the Secretary of Transportation have done here. 
Once construction is begun and heavy investment made on the two end segments, the 
available options for routing the middle segment are severely limited .... [Tlhe two 
segments now approved stand like gun barrels pointing into the heartland of the park. 
[d. (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 
468 F.2d 1164, 1183-84 (6th Cir. 1972) ("The more time and resources [the agency isl allowed to 
invest in this project, the greater becomes the likelihood that compliance with section 102 of the 
NEPA, and the reconsideration of the project in light of the provisions of section 101, will prove 
to be merely an empty gesture."); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1333 
(4th Cir. 1972) (halting construction on 1-66 until a NEPA review was performed, noting: 
[flurther investment of time, effort, or money in the proposed route would make 
alteration or abandonment of the route increasingly less wise and, therefore, increas-
ingly unlikely. If investment in the proposed route were to continue prior to and during 
the Secretary's consideration of the environmental report, the options open to the 
Secretary would diminish, and at some point his consideration would become a mean-
ingless formality); 
Highland Cooperative v. City of Lansing, 492 F. Supp. 1372, 1383 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (enjoining 
all parts of highway project because "[tlo allow defendants to make a substantial commitment 
of resources to one segment, while preparing the EIS for the other would be to avoid the spirit 
and letter of NEPA"). 
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private actions.125 For example, in Maryland Conservation Council v. 
Gilchrist, a county tried to ensure that a partially federally funded 
highway would be routed through a park, as the county, and investors 
in a nearby development project preferred.126 The county exerted 
influence by approving construction on portions of the highway out-
side the boundary of a park prior to completion of the federal govern-
ment's EIS.127 The issue for the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit was whether to enjoin the county from authorizing 
private parties to begin construction outside the park.128 
Prior to completing the segments of the road outside the park, the 
private parties in Gilchrist needed to obtain several federal permits.129 
Any action authorized by federal permit is deemed to be a federal 
action for purposes of NEPA and § 4(£).130 The court concluded that 
effectuating the purpose of NEPA required completion of an EIS 
before construction of any portion of the road.131 Allowing any con-
struction before issuance of a final EIS inevitably would influence the 
Secretary of Transportation's decision.132 The court stated that "[n]on-
federal actors may not be permitted to evade NEPA by completing a 
project without an EIS and then presenting the responsible federal 
125 See supra notes 126-40. 
126 See Maryland Conservation Council v. Gilchrist, 808 F.2d 1039, 1041 (4th Cir. 1986). 
127 Id. By authorizing construction by private real estate developers near the park, over 26% 
of the road would have begun prior to completion of the federal government's EIS. Id. at 104l. 
128 See id. at 1042. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. If a private, local, or state authority has to obtain a federal permit to complete the 
action, essentially giving the federal government "approval power," the action is brought into 
the realm of a federal "action," subject to all applicable regulations. See id. at 1043. This 
reasoning applies to cases involving the ESA as well. See, e.g., Roosevelt Campobello Int'I. Park 
v. U.S.E.P.A., 684 F.2d 1041, 1046-47 (1st Cir. 1982) (showing how the requirement that a 
privately financed oil refinery obtain a permit from EPA brings entire project into realm ofESA 
scrutiny); see also Michael C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty: A 
Preface, 20 ENVTL. L. 447, 469 (1989) (discussing "Small Federal Handle Problem"). The "small 
federal handle problem" is about NEPA's ability to affect private actions which require federal 
permission. See id. The "small federal handle problem" consists of figuring out how broadly an 
agency should consider the effects of its action on the environment. To illustrate the problem, 
Professor Blumm presents an example of an oil refinery requesting a permit from the Corps of 
Engineers to build a dock. Id. Courts have supported the view that the Corps only need analyze 
the effects of the dock on the water, rather than analyzing the effects of the entire oil refinery 
on the environment, although, without the dock the refinery could not proceed. See id.; see also 
Patrick A. Parenteau, Small Handles, Big Impacts: When Do Corps Permits Federalize 
Private Development?, 20 ENVTL. L. 747, 756-57 (1990) (criticizing Corps's approach to NEPA 
which ignores cumulative effects of its actions, and suggesting that scope of NEPA analysis 
should depend on reasonably foreseeable effects of proposals). 
131 See Gilchrist, 808 F.2d at 1042. 
132 See id. 
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agency with a fait accompli."133 The court rejected the county's at-
tempt to "evade" NEPA and to use sunk costs to influence the deci-
sion-making process by recognizing that the scope of NEPA reaches 
beyond federal actors.134 
Similarly, in Alpine Lakes Protection Society v. United States For-
est Service [hereinafter Alpine Lakes], the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington also recognized that the 
scope of NEPA review can extend beyond immediate federal ac-
tions.135 In Alpine Lakes the Forest Service had approved the use of 
a temporary access road across National Forest lands without issuing 
either a formal environmental assessment or an environmental impact 
statement as required by NEPA.136 The Forest Service claimed that 
the access roads qualified for categorical exclusions under the Serv-
ice's own internal rules.137 The court, however, noted that agencies 
cannot divide projects into parts, each of which has an insignificant 
environmental impact, but which collectively have a substantial im-
pact. l38 Moreover, the court reasoned: 
[t]he Ninth Circuit has held that where access road construction 
and contemplated timber harvesting are "inextricably intertwined" 
such that the timber harvesting could not proceed without the 
road and the road would not be built but for the contemplated 
harvesting, the Forest Service was required to consider the envi-
ronmental effect of the timber cutting which the access road was 
being built to facilitate .... This requirement extends to non-fed-
eral actions undertaken exclusively by private parties if the fed-
eral actions are so interrelated as to constitute "links in the same 
bit of chain."139 
Because the Forest Service did not consider the impact of the private 
logging activities in determining whether an Environmental Assess-
ment (EA) or an EIS was necessary, the court found the agency 
approval of the access permit arbitrary and capricious.14o 
1331d. 
134 See id. 
135 Alpine Lakes Protection Soc'y v. United States Forest Serv., 838 F. Supp. 478, 484 (W.D. 
Wash. 1993) [hereinafter Alpine Lakes]. 
1361d. at 480. 
1371d. 
138 ld. at 481. 
1391d. at 482. (quoting Morgan v. Walter, 728 F. Supp. 1483, 1493 (D. Idaho 1989) quoting 
Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 884 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1989)) (citations 
omitted). 
140 Alpine Lakes, 838 F. Supp. at 483. 
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Judicial reasoning rejecting the sunk cost tactic in the context of 
segmentation under NEPA and § 4(f) is consistent. Such reasoning 
should inform courts confronted with similar violations under the 
ESA. Even if segmentation is rejected by courts, however, agencies 
have yet another argument with which to circumvent environmental 
protection. 
C. Sunk Costs Not Committed in "Bad Faith" 
This Comment has thus far considered cases in which attempts 
were made to circumvent environmental laws by arguing that those 
laws did not apply to actions undertaken because of the reversibility 
or limited effect of the actions.141 A different strategy, used by devel-
opers, as well as state and federal agencies, is to argue that although 
investment in a project technically violated environmental statutes, 
the project should continue unless the project proponents used the 
sunk cost strategy in "bad faith."l42 
Proving bad faith is a notoriously difficult proposition;l43 yet, in the 
only case to consider sunk costs explicitly, Eagle Foundation, Inc. v. 
Dole, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
placed that burden on the plaintiffs.144 In Eagle Foundation, a high-
way project had progressed in violation of environmental law. 145 The 
court held that the sunk costs already invested in the project could 
be used to influence the decision to allow the project to proceed, unless 
those costs were incurred intentionally to undermine objective evalu-
ation of the project.146 This analysis gave the preferred project design 
of the Department of Transportation (DOT) nearly a three million 
141 See discussion supra Sections III.A-B. 
142 See infra notes 142-50. 
143 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costie, 657 F.2d 298, 390 n.450 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the 
Environmental Defense Fund had not made the requisite showing of bad faith or improper 
conduct to warrant further discovery); Organized Fishermen of Florida, Inc. v. Franklin, 846 F. 
Supp. 1569, 1574 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (requiring showing of "clear and convincing evidence" to prove 
NOAA administrator acted in bad faith); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 358 
(D.D.C. 1979) (finding no evidence that Secretary was trying to "steamroll" project and no 
evidence of bad faith), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
144 See Eagle Foundation, Inc. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 809 (7th Cir. 1987). 
145 See id. at 800--0l. 
146 See id. at 808--09 ("Perhaps the right accommodation is to allow the Secretary to take 
account of sunk costs unless the expenses were incurred as part of an effort to undermine a fair 
comparison of costs.") The court, however, never resolved the issue of whether the costs were 
incurred for such a purpose, finding that the $2.7 million in sunk costs was so insignificant 
compared to the total costs of the project, that the sunk costs would play virtually no role in 
the DOT's final decision. [d. 
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dollar advantage over the plaintiff's proposed route, because the DOT 
had already incurred that amount of sunk costS.147 
Similarly, in Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was troubled by the Soil Con-
servation Service's rush to finish a dune restoration project without 
fulfilling the environmental mitigation measures set forth in the EIS.l48 
Nevertheless, the court was not willing to issue an injunction absent 
a clear showing of "bad faith," shown by "a conscious design to cir-
cumvent the requirements of NEPA."149 The plaintiffs in Ogunquit 
Village were unable to meet this difficult burden and the Soil Conser-
vation Service's project was never altered.150 
Federal agencies repeatedly present far-fetched interpretations of 
environmental statutes. Although these interpretations do not consti-
tute "bad faith" according to the strict standards of most courts, these 
interpretations nonetheless permit the agencies to incur sunk costS.15l 
For example, in Lane County Audubon Society v. Jamison the Bu-
reau of Land Management (BLM) sought to circumvent § 7(d) of the 
ESA by arguing that adopting a massive spotted owl recovery plan 
was merely a "policy statement," as opposed to an "agency action."152 
This interpretation would have allowed the agency to avoid formal 
consultation with the FWS.l53 The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit did not accept the BLM's tortured interpretation of 
the ESA and found that the recovery plan was an "agency action."l54 
Because implementing the plan prior to consultation would have vio-
lated § 7(a)(2) of the ESA, the court enjoined implementation of the 
147 See Wade v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Eagle Foundation, 
Inc. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1987). The United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, however, did recognize the dangers of the sunk costs involved in the case, 
noting: 
Id. 
[w]e have serious reservations about the validity of the defendants' cost analysis. 
Because it excludes sunk costs, and the Napoleon Hollow alternative is the only 
alternative on which any costs were "sunk," the defendants' analysis gives Napoleon 
Hollow a cost advantage relative to the other alternatives. In effect, Napoleon Hollow 
becomes the only alternative for which no "start-up" costs would have to be paid. As 
one federal official noted, this approach does not provide an "apples-to-apples" com-
parison of Napoleon Hollow with the alternative routes. 
148 Ogunquit Village Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.2d 243, 244 (1st Cir. 1977); see also Thomas O. 
McGarity, Judicial Enforcement of NEPA-Inspired Promises, 20 ENvTL. L. 569, 595 (1990). 
149 Ogunquit Village, 553 F.2d at 246. 
150Id. at 247. 
151 See supra notes 152-56. 
152 Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1992). 
153 See id. 
154Id. at 294. Federal agency "action" is defined broadly as, "all activities or programs of any 
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plan. I55 This injunction ended all timber sales under the plan, because 
those sales represented "irreversible and irretrievable" commitments 
of resources, strictly prohibited by § 7(d).I56 
Agencies use "bad faith" to circumvent environmental law. Because 
"bad faith" is difficult to prove in court, however, this strategy has 
been successfully employed in some instances. The arsenal of argu-
ments used by defendants places a heavy burden on plaintiffs. For 
protectors of the environment, the question remains whether the 
plain language of environmental laws, legislative history, or public 
policy is strong enough to refute the underhanded use of the sunk cost 
strategy. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF CASES INVOLVING USE OF SUNK COST TACTIC 
The effectiveness of arguments that take advantage of the sunk 
costs strategy is troubling because § 7(d) plainly prohibits sunk costs. 
Allowing courts to usurp Congress's role by creating exemptions from 
the ESA threatens endangered species and is contrary to Congress's 
statutory scheme in creating the ESA.I57 Although the ESA contem-
plates no role for courts in creating exemptions from the statute, the 
seductiveness of sunk costs defenses are so persuasive that some 
courts succumb to the practical pressure to let illegal projects con-
tinue. Analysis under the ESA should be informed by the more con-
sistent interpretations under other similar environmental laws such 
as NEPA and § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act. 
A. When Is an Irreversible Commitment of 
Resources not "Irreversible?" 
One common argument used to facilitate the sunk cost strategy is 
to claim that there has been no "irreversible or irretrievable" com-
mitment of resources. I5S The court in Bays' Legal Fund ignored the 
statutory provisions of the E SA.159 Undoubtedly, the court desired to 
see the sewage treatment plant completed, because every day that 
kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United 
States or upon the high seas." 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1994). 
155 See Lane County Audubon, 958 F.2d at 294. 
156 [d. at 295; see also Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1056--57 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(suggesting that going forward with timber, range and road projects should be considered 
violative of § 7(d)). 
157 See supra Section ILA.I. 
158 See supra notes 55-64 (discussing Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner). 
159 See Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. 102, 112 (D. Mass. 1993). 
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the plant was inoperative was another days' pollution being dumped 
into Massachusetts Bay.160 However, reasoning that the commitment 
of resources to the sewage treatment facility was not "irreversible or 
irretrievable" under § 7(d) is inconsistent with Congress's purpose in 
passing § 7(d).l6l The ESA allows a court no role in balancing the 
interests of completing a project against the interests of protecting 
endangered species.162 As the Supreme Court noted, Congress had 
already done the balancing between projects and endangered species 
and found in favor of the latter.l63 In Bays' Legal Fund the agencies 
involved in approving the sewage treatment facility should have ap-
plied for a formal exemption from the Committee assigned to grant 
exemptions under § 7(h) of the ESA.I64 Judicial exemption from the 
ESA undermines congressional intent and implicitly encourages agen-
cies and private developers to use sunk costS.165 
The court in Bays' Legal Fund ignored not only the reasoning of 
the Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill, but also ignored the lesson of 
160 See id. at 113 ("Halting construction altogether, with an eye toward abandoning the outfall 
tunnel project, would not be a reasonable or prudent approach, given the adverse impact that 
such non-action has already had on coastal water quality."). 
A court was faced with a similarly difficult decision, the results of which would inconvenience 
the public by delaying the completion of a much needed highway expansion, in California Least 
Tern, 816 F.2d 1376, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). But, in contrast to Bays' Legal Fund, the court in 
California Least Tern enjoined construction on the project in light of the ESA violation. See 
California Least Tern, 816 F.2d at 1389 ("We are aware that our decision may delay the public's 
enjoyment of the project's benefits and may significantly increase the costs .... We conclude, 
however, that regardless of any consequences of delay, the ESA requires this result."). 
161 See discussion supra Section II.A.I. 
162 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 
524, 527 (1982) (arguing that when a court is confronted with any clear statutory violation, a 
court has no discretion or authority to balance the equities so as to permit that violation to 
continue); Oliver A. Houck, The 'Institutionalization of Caution' Under § 7 of the Endangered 
Species Act: What Do You Do When You Don't Know?, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. 15,001, 15,010 (1982) 
("It is not a matter of balancing the equities; the Congress has already struck the balance in 
favor of endangered species."); see also California Least Tern, 816 F.2d at 1383 ("We may not 
use equity's scale to strike a different balance [between endangered species and federal pro-
jects]."). 
163 See TVA, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making 
it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species 
the highest of priorities, thereby adopting a policy which it described as 'institutionalized 
caution.'''); see also Williams, supra note 60, at 128 (questioning Judge Mazzone's ruling in light 
ofthe reasoning in TVA). 
164 See discussion supra Section II.A.2. (discussing exemption process under ESA § 7(h»; see 
also California Least Tern, 816 F.2d at 1383 n.lO ("We find it significant that Congress gave the 
power to grant exemptions to the Endangered Species Committee, not to the courts."). 
165 Even if the ruling in Bays' Legal Fund never results in harm to endangered species in 
Massachusetts Bay, the precedent that Judge Mazzone set may harm endangered species 
elsewhere. See Williams, supra note 60, at 133 (claiming that not enjoining the defendants from 
further action in Bays' Legal Fund set bad precedent). Judge Mazzone's ruling may induce 
--- --------
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Overton Park.166 In Overton Park the Supreme Court recognized that 
reading § 4(f) to allow the Secretary to approve the highway without 
any meaningful consideration would be to assume that Congress passed 
§ 4(f) for no reason.167 The Supreme Court rejected the idea that 
Congress passes meaningless statutes.168 The court in Bays' Legal 
Fund, however, reads § 7(d)'s preclusion against "irreversible and 
irretrievable" commitments so narrowly as to render the entire sec-
tion meaningless.169 
Realistically, the problem in Bays' Legal Fund was not that Judge 
Mazzone did not understand the implications of the ESAYo Rather, 
$150 million in sunk costs had been invested in the outfall tunnel 
project.l7l The practical pressure not to enjoin such a project was 
simply irresistible.172 
Bays'Legal Fund demonstrates the insight shown by Judge Breyer 
in Sears Island.173 Judge Breyer warned that merely because some-
thing theoretically can be removed, or taken apart, or never turned 
on, does not mean the project is not harming the environment.174 The 
sunk costs themselves are an increased risk to the environment and 
should be enjoined.175 
courts similarly to ignore the ESA when courts feel that to enforce the ESA would be an 
"exaltation of form over substance." Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. 102, 111 (D. Mass. 1995). 
166 See supra note 88. 
167 See Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1971). 
168 See id. 
169 See Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 112. 
170 Judge Mazzone authored the district court's opinion in Massachusetts v. Watt, in which he 
reiterated the Supreme Court's finding that the ESA is designed to prevent the loss of any 
endangered species and "admit[s] of no exception." Massachusetts v. Watt, 560 F. Supp. 561, 573 
(D. Mass.) aff'd, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983). In Bays' Legal Fund, apparently Judge Mazzone 
changed his mind. Compare Watt, 560 F. Supp. at 573 (applying reasoning of Supreme Court in 
TVA that ESA "admit[s] of no exception[sJ") with Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 111 
(refusing to enforce ESA because enjoining construction on outfall tunnel would be "an exalta-
tion of form over SUbstance"). 
171 Bays' Legal Fund, 828 F. Supp. at 112 n.22. Over $148 million had been invested in the 
construction of an outfall tunnel and an additional $48 million would be lost if the court ordered 
termination ofthe project. Id. 
172 See id. The court's opinion in Bays' Legal Fund reflects a general sympathy towards 
proponents of the project in light of the perceived waste that would occur if the project were 
stopped. I d. at 111 (noting that the Biological Opinion in the case "satisfied the spirit, if not the 
letter, of § 7(c) [of the ESAJ"). But see California Least Tern, 816 F.2d 1376, 1384 (9th Cir. 1987) 
("Only by requiring substantial compliance with the [ESA's] procedures can we effectuate the 
intent of the legislature."); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 764 (9th Cir. 1985) ("If a project 
is allowed to proceed without substantial compliance with those procedural requirements, there 
can be no assurance that a violation of the ESA's substantive provisions will not result"). 
173 See supra notes 68-78. 
174 See Sears Island, 872 F.2d 497, 500-01 (1st Cir. 1989). 
175 See id.; see also Herrmann, supra note 32, at 1288 (noting that when a court is deciding 
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By allowing federal agencies to commit resources prior to the com-
pletion of consultation, the government irreparably harms the envi-
ronment by tipping the balance in favor of one particular alterna-
tive.176 As in Bays' Legal Fund, asserting that projects can proceed 
at their own risk is disingenuous because the more time and money 
spent on a project, the less likely alteration or abandonment be-
comes.177 Agencies must not be allowed to forge ahead with projects 
without complete information regarding the impact of the projects on 
an endangered species.178 Ignoring § 7(d) places courts in the precarious 
position of choosing between ordering the loss of millions of taxpay-
ers' dollars179 or threatening the existence of an endangered species.180 
Similarly, courts need to prohibit the use of the sunk costs strategy 
that agencies justify with other arguments, such as segmentation. 
B. Segmentation Rejected Across the Board: § 7(d) of the ESA, 
NEPA and § J,,(f) of the Department of Transportation Act 
Allowing projects to be segmented into individual parts to avoid 
environmental' regulation has been rejected, although not uniformly, 
in the context of government lease sales, highway construction cases, 
and combined state/federal projects under the ESA,181 NEPA,182 and 
whether or not an action which violates NEPA should be enjoined, "[t]he pertinent question is 
not whether an agency can retrieve its investment, but whether an agency's investment, 
retrievable or not, will increase the risk that it will make a decision causing environmental 
harm"). 
176 See Sears Island, 872 F.2d at 500--01. 
177 See supra notes 3--6 (discussing Tellico Dam-endangered species controversy). 
178 See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1093 (W.D. Wash.) (noting that, 
rather than rush to get projects rolling, agencies should wait months, years, or sometimes 
longer, in order to assure that they have made the most informed decision possible), afI'd, 952 
F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991). The Seattle Audubon Society court considers the issue of what happens 
if an agency has done everything it can to obtain information on the effects of an endangered 
species but still does not know what the effect of the project will be on endangered species. See 
id. at 1096. Technically, the consultation does not end until the agency determines the likely 
effect on the species and issues a Biological Opinion. ESA § 7(b)(3)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). 
This suggests that the § 7(d) preclusion against "irreversible and irretrievable commitment[s] 
of resources" might remain in effect in perpetuity if the effects of a project on a species cannot 
be determined. See Houck, supra note 162, at 15,010 (proposing solution to this problem by 
advocating that agencies should adhere to § 7(d) for a period of time, but that after a specified 
waiting period, if a project's impact on the endangered species is still inconclusive, that "jeopardy" 
under § 7(a)(2) be presumed and the agency be allowed to proceed to the exemption process). 
179 See TVA, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
180 See Bays' Legal Fund v. Browner, 828 F. Supp. 102, 112 (D. Mass. 1993). 
181 See supra notes 92-97 (discussing Conner v. Burford). 
182 See supra notes 135-40 (discussing Alpine Lakes Protection Society v. United States Forest 
Service). 
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§4 (f) of the Department of Transportation Act.ls3 Cases rejecting 
segmentation illustrate that environmental regulations cannot be cir-
cumvented by using sunk costs to steamroll projects to completion. 
The court in Conner v. Burford held that allowing a lease sale prior 
to thorough evaluation of the effects of mineral exploration and ex-
traction on the endangered species in the area would violate § 7(d).I84 
Implicitly, the court recognized the danger posed by allowing the 
lease-that the project would gain momentum that would undermine 
later objective assessment of environmental impacts. ls5 Moreover, the 
court was realistic in recognizing the importance of this segment to 
the entire project and thus was wary of the segmentation argument.IS6 
Although the North Slope Borough v. Andrus court allowed an oil 
exploration project to be approved in phases, this holding was not an 
endorsement of segmentation. Rather, the holding was based spe-
cifically on the fact that the OCSLAI87 explicitly called for viewing the 
project in distinct phases-oil leasing, oil exploration, and oil produc-
tion and that provisions within the statute enhanced rather than 
hindered the strength of the ESA.18s Moreover, the court could rely 
on the Secretary of the Interior's altering the terms of the leases if 
oil exploration activities threatened endangered species.189 Thus, the 
specific statutory framework in Andrus authorized segmentationl90 
183 See supra notes 118--24 (discussing San Antonio Conservation Society). 
184 See Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that agency action entails 
not only leasing but leasing and post-leasing activities through production and abandonment), 
cen. denied sub nom. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Lujan, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989). 
185 See id. at 1454-57. 
186 See id. 
187 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356. 
188 North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 595, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Secretary 
of Interior v. Califoruia, 464 U.S. 312, 339-40 (1984) (explaining how the interaction between the 
OCSLA and the ESA combine to preserve the protection due endangered species even though 
oil exploration is approved segmentally); Conservation Law Found., Etc. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 
712, 715 (lst Cir. 1979) (reasoning that the OCSLA and the ESA work together to assure the 
highest protection to endangered species). 
189 See Andrus, 642 F.2d at 595. 
190 See id. at 611. The regulations implementing the ESA explicitly allow agencies to approve 
projects in "incremental steps" when authorized by statute. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(k) (1994) 
(allowing the Secretary to authorize a biological opinion on an incremental step of a federal 
project and allow that step to proceed if such an incremental approach is authorized by statute). 
When doing so, however, agencies must consider each step in the context of the entire agency 
action and apply the principles of § 7(d). Id. Section 402.14(k) is qualified in that incremental 
steps only may be approved so long as they do not, "violate section 7(d) of the Act conceruing 
irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources" and as long as "[tlhere is reasonable 
likelihood that the entire action will not violate section 7(a)(2) of the Act." 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.14(4)--{5). 
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and the case does not stand for the effectiveness of segmentation 
otherwise.191 
In addition to rejecting agency segmentation arguments in ESA 
cases, courts have rejected agency segmentation arguments aimed at 
avoiding comprehensive review under other environmental statutes 
such as NEPA and § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act.192 
Courts most consistently and adamantly reject this approach in cases 
involving highway projects.193 For example, the court's reasoning in 
San Antonio Conservation Society achieved Congress's goal of pre-
venting parklands from being converted into highways, unless a care-
ful consideration of alternatives has been completed.l94 In language 
similar to that used in TV A seven years later, the court in San Anto-
nio Conservation Society noted "[t]he conflict between Parklands and 
Highways has already been resolved in the Halls of Congress, which 
is the proper place in our system of Government for priority decisions 
to be made. And, as the statutes here in question make clear, parklands 
and environmental values are considered paramount."195 The same 
reasoning should apply to the ESA, erecting § 7(d) as Congress in-
tended-as a blanket prohibition against sunk costS.196 
Likewise, agencies not characterizing projects as federal actions 
should be no more effective in circumventing the ESA than NEPA. 
Thus, § 7(d) should prohibit non-federal actors from sinking resources 
into a project in which federal actors participate. For example, the 
Fourth Circuit in Maryland Conservation Council v. Gilchrist held 
that if a federal agency's approval is required at any stage of a pri-
191 Despite statutory authority to approve the lease sales, the court failed to realize, or 
perhaps ignored, that if the Secretary of Interior did revoke the leases, the Secretary would 
have had to compensate the oil companies. See Houck, supra note 162, at 15,009 n.l05; see also 
North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326, 330 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting damages resulting 
from cancellation of a lease under OCSLA may be formidable). This potential liability would 
influence any Secretary contemplating revocation of oil exploration leases and is the kind of 
pressure that § 7(d) was designed to prevent. See Houck, supra note 162, at 15,009 n.l05; see 
also Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952-53 (1st Cir. 1983) (rejecting approval of oil 
exploration project in phases and recognizing that the more planning and investment oil com-
panies committed to a project, the more pressure there would be on federal agencies to approve 
the project). 
192 See supra Section III.B.2. 
193 See supra note 124. 
194 See San Antonio Conservation Soe'y, 446 F.2d 1013, 1021 (5th Cir. 1971), em. denied sub 
nom. Texas Highway Dep't v. Named Individuals, 406 U.S. 933 (1972). Congress similarly 
mandated the emphasis that must be placed on the preservation of endangered species when 
their survival is in conflict with a proposed project. See TVA, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
195 San Antonio Conservation Soe'y, 446 F.2d at 1024; see also TVA, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). 
196 See supra Section II.A.l. 
1996] SUNK COSTS 425 
marily non-federal project, the non-federal actor cannot evade NEPA 
by completing a portion of the project and then seeking agency ap-
proval.197 Another court endorsed the same reasoning, noting that if 
private actions are so interrelated to federal actions as to constitute 
"links in the same bit of chain" then the non-federal actions cannot go 
forward without proper review under NEPA.l98 Adopting similar rea-
soning, the court in California Least Tern issued a broad injunction 
halting state sponsored construction on both sides of a highway.199 The 
court recognized that although the nests of endangered species were 
only on one side of the road, construction activities even on the other 
side of the road effectively could eliminate alternatives that might 
mitigate harmful effects on endangered species.2°O 
It is necessary for courts to resist allowing characterization of 
projects as non-federal because tangential state or private actions can 
cut off federal project alternatives just as effectively as can federal 
actions.201 Thus, courts must recognize the impact that projects paid 
for and implemented by private, state, or local parties have on federal 
projects.202 If the influence of such projects threatens to cut off alter-
natives for federal decision-makers, § 7(d) requires courts to halt such 
activities.203 To limit the scope of § 7(d) only to activities conducted 
directly by a federal agency allows sunk costs to occur and undercuts 
the purpose and effectiveness of § 7(d). 
Wariness of segmentation in cases involving NEPA and § 4(t) should 
be retained in cases involving § 7(d). Still, there are more tactics that 
are employed to pursue the sunk costs strategy. 
C. Asking Plaintiffs to Prove "Bad Faith" is Asking Too Much 
Requiring plaintiffs to prove that an agency acted in bad faith 
before a court will disqualify sunk costs is supported by neither the 
197 See Maryland Conservation Council v. Gilchrist, 808 F.2d 1040, 1042 (4th Cir. 1986). 
198 Alpine Lakes, 838 F. Supp. 478, 482 (W.D.Wash. 1993); see also Profitt v. Department of 
Interior Ex. ReI. Lujan, 825 F. Supp. 159, 161 (W.D. Ky. 1993) ("Nonfederal defendants are 
amenable to the strictures of NEPA ... if they enter into a partnership or a joint venture with 
the federal government.") 
199 See California Least Tern, 816 F.2d 1376, 1389 (9th Cir. 1987). 
200 See id. 
WI See, e.g., Gilchrist, 808 F.2d at 1042 (private parties increasing likelihood that federally 
funded highway would harm park). 
202 See Steiger, supra note 110, at 245 (arguing that when a federal program is delegated to a 
state that state actions taken pursuant to the federal program should be deemed federal action, 
requiring the state to assume § 7(a)(2) obligations directly). 
203 See ESA § 7(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d). 
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statutory language of the ESA nor its legislative history.204 Thus, this 
judicially imposed restriction is unwarranted and undermines the 
effectiveness of § 7(d)'s unqualified prohibition of "irreversible and 
irretrievable" commitments of resources prior to the conclusion of 
consultation. 
As was demonstrated in Eagle Foundation v. Dole and Ogunquit 
Village, plaintiffs rarely will be able to prove successfully bad faith 
because agencies are usually politically astute enough not to reduce 
incriminating remarks to paper for plaintiffs to find.205 One commen-
tator noted, in the context of environmental litigation, that "[a] plain-
tiff will, no doubt, find it very difficult to prove bad faith in most cases, 
absent some 'smoking pistol' memorandum betraying a clear intent to 
violate NEPA's procedural requirements.''206 Courts should thus focus 
on the effects of sunk costs, not the subjective intentions of the actors 
who incurred the costs. Whether incurred intentionally or not, in good 
faith or bad, sunk costs increase the likelihood that a project will pro-
ceed prematurely, contrary to congressional intent in passing § 7(d).207 
In addition to freeing plaintiffs from having to prove bad faith, 
courts should be reluctant to accept assurances of objective reassess-
ment from agencies that already are involved in a project. In North 
Carolina v. Virginia Beach, although the Fourth Circuit recognized 
the dangers of bureaucratic momentum, the court was not willing to 
find that sunk costs were so likely to influence later decisions that an 
injunction was warranted.208 However, the court's reliance on agency 
assurances that the sunk costs would not affect an objective re-evalu-
ation of the project amounts to "whistling in the dark."209 The Fourth 
Circuit's reliance on agency good faith is unrealistic in light of the 
self-interests many agencies have in seeing certain federal projects 
through to completion. Moreover, the ESA, as well as the other envi-
ronmental statutes discussed in this Comment, call for assessment 
before investment of resources, not reassessments relying on agency 
good faith. 
204 See supra Section ILA.1. 
205 See McGarity, supra note 148, at 594. 
206Id. McGarity continues, "[tlhe bad faith test that the court [in Ogunquit Village Corpora-
tion v. Davisl articulated for requiring a supplemental EIS ... may be impossible to meet in 
practice." Id. at 595. 
207 See supra Section II.A.1. 
208 See supra notes 85-87. 
209 North Carolina v. Virginia Beach, 951 F.2d 596,612 (4th Cir. 1991) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). 
1996] SUNK COSTS 427 
Although assessing the effects before committing resources seems 
like the obvious timing contemplated by Congress, agencies have 
argued that the prohibition against irreversible and irretrievable com-
mitments does not apply until consultation begins. To sustain this 
interpretation agencies point to the language of § 7(d), which states 
that "[aljter initiation of consultation required under [§ 7(a)(2)], the 
Federal agency ... shall not make any irreversible or irretrievable 
commitment or resources .... "210 Thus, agencies have an incentive to 
delay intentionally entering into consultation for as long as possible 
to avoid § 7(d)'s preclusion of commitments of resources. 
This reasoning, however, is simply and fatally flawed. Section 7(a)(2) 
enjoins activities which "may affect" the endangered species including 
activities undertaken prior to initiation of consultation·211 Thus, an 
agency gains nothing by arguing that § 7(d) does not apply to a 
project because the agency had not yet entered into consultation 
regarding that project. Before consultation, an even more stringent 
prohibition against commitments of resources to the project would 
apply-that is, anything that "may affect" an endangered species 
would be precluded under § 7(a)(2), whereas only things which are 
"irreversible and irretrievable" are prohibited under § 7(d).212 
Thus, agencies may not delay entering into consultation for the 
purposes of avoiding § 7(d).213 As soon as an agency realizes that its 
action "may affect" an endangered species, the need for consultation 
is triggered, § 7(d) is effective, and "resources may not be committed 
in violation of this section."214 As stated in Andrus, "[a]ny other inter-
pretation would defeat the legislative purposes underlying the amend-
210 ESA § 7(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (emphasis added); see also Pacific Rivers Council v. 
Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1994) ("As the ESA's plain language makes clear, § 7(d) 
applies only after an agency has initiated consultation under § 7(a)(2)."). 
211 See, e.g., Pacific Rivers Council, 30 F.3d at 1056 (remanding case to district court to 
determine scope of injunction when Forest Service failed to enter into consultation with NMFS, 
as required under § 7(a)(2), with respect to timber sales which "may affect" endangered salmon); 
Lane County Audubon v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 295 (9th Cir. 1992) (halting timber sales until 
the BLM entered into consultation with the FWS regarding effects of timber sales on spotted 
owls). 
212 See ESA § 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
213 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (1994) (noting that an agency must determine "at the earliest possible 
time" whether the proposed action "may affect listed species or critical habitat"); see also Cutler 
v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 896-97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that "excessive delay" in agency actions 
"saps the public confidence in an agency's ability to discharge its responsibilities," and that 
"unjustifiable delay" may undermine statutory schemes and harm individuals). 
214 North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 355 (D.D.C.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 
642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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ments to the ESA, and undermine the effectiveness of the ESA Com-
mittee."215 In other words, courts cannot let agencies stick their heads 
in the sand and continue with detrimental projects under the false 
presumption that no news is good news.216 
V. RESULTS OF SUNK COSTS 
The previous section of this Comment analyzed how defendants 
sometimes use a smokescreen of arguments to undermine the intent 
of environmental laws. Viewing these defendants' actions broadly, a 
basic strategy emerges. If a project that is initiated prematurely faces 
a challenge, an agency likely will argue that environmental laws do 
not apply, suggesting that a portion of project is not "irreversible or 
irretrievable," or is a segment too insignificant to require formal 
consultation. If these arguments are unsuccessful, the agency may 
argue that despite a technical statutory violation, there was no "bad 
faith" involved on the part of the agency and therefore the project 
should proceed. As developers continue to pour concrete and remove 
trees, the project proceeds without any discussion of its merits having 
occurred. If plaintiffs finally are able to obtain review of the agency's 
actions, defendants then take full advantage of the sunk costs that 
were incurred. Agencies point to the sunk costs and argue that en-
forcing the ESA after so much investment in the project would be not 
only a waste of money, but also bad public policy. 
If plaintiffs actually survive all these hurdles and force a court to 
look at the merits of the case, courts should not let sunk costs prevent 
the enforcement of the ESA. Prohibiting sunk costs is overwhelm-
ingly in the public interest. Prohibiting sunk costs will, in the long 
run, save taxpayers money.217 Additionally, agencies such as the FWS 
and the NMFS, free from the political pressures to approve an already 
existing project, will be able to assess honestly and accurately the 
impacts of a project on endangered species and to constructively 
mitigate such effects.218 Finally, perhaps the most insidious effect of 
sunk costs is the risk of stifling public debate and preventing citizens 
from taking an active part in decisions affecting their environment.219 
215 [d. 
216 See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 715 F.2d 653, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("judicial review of decisions 
not to regulate must not be frustrated by blind acceptance of an agency's claim that a decision 
is still under study") (emphasis in original). 
217 See infra Section V.A. 
218 See infra Section V.B. 
219 See infra Section V.C. 
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Judicial enforcement of § 7(d) as Congress intended will ensure that 
the public continues to have an active voice in shaping the natural 
world around us. 
A. Public Funds Are Wasted by Allowing Sunk Costs 
Wise economic policy dictates that government agencies not incur 
sunk costs. One of the motivating factors in passing § 7(d) was to 
protect public funds from being wasted.220 In TVA developers rushed 
construction of the Tellico Dam, hoping to complete the project before 
an accurate cost-benefit analysis revealed that the long range eco-
nomic benefits of the project were at most speculative, and hardly 
could justify the permanent long-term environmental damage the 
dam would cause.221 
Several courts and commentators have noted the waste of public 
resources that can occur when projects, like the Tellico Dam, are 
begun prematurely.222 For instance, in South Carolina Department of 
Wildlife & Marine Resources v. Marsh, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit questioned the economic prudence of 
the Corps' decision to install pumped storage generators before the 
generators were approved for use in the project.223 The court noted 
the "financial waste" that could occur by the Corps' decision to install 
pumped storage facilities which may never be allowed to operate.224 
In Bays' Legal Fund, only four percent of the $148 million being 
invested in the outfall tunnel project was federal funds.225 The balance 
of the project would be paid by increased water rates to local home-
owners.226 The residents surrounding Boston would have paid for the 
cost of the project regardless of whether the project became opera-
220 See National Wildlife Federation v. National Park Service, 669 F. Supp. 384, 390 (D. Wyo. 
1987) ("[Section 7(d)] was enacted by Congress mainly to prevent incidents such as the more 
than $50 million loss at Tellico Dam as a result of TVA v. Hill."). 
221 See Species Panel Denies Exemption to Tellico Dam, But Exempts Grayrocks Dam, 9 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1776 (Jan. 26, 1979) (quoting Charles Schultze, Chairman of 
Economic Advisors, noting that "[t]he project is 95 percent complete and if one takes just the 
cost of finishing it against the benefits ... it doesn't pay, which says something about its original 
design"). 
222 See, e.g., South Carolina Dep't of Wildlife & Marine Resources v. Marsh, 866 F.2d 97, 101 
(7th Cir. 1989); see also, Williams, supra note 60, at 137 n.68. 
223 South Carolina Dep't of Wildlife & Marine Resources, 866 F.2d at 10l. 
224 See id. 
225 See Williams, supra note 60, at 137 n.68. 
226Id. Homeowners' rates were expected to increase from $535 annually in 1993 to $855 
annually in 1998. See Elizabeth Ross, Boston Harbor Goes Clean, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Sept. 10, 1992 (Habitat) at 10. 
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tional.227 Thus, preventing sunk costs is not just an environmental 
concern; preventing sunk costs is sound fiscal management of the 
public funds. 
B. Agencies Become Biased and Effective 
Consultation is Eviscerated 
Allowing the sunk costs strategy to prevail promotes pressured and 
biased decisions from the agencies designed to protect this nation's 
wildlife. Sinking costs into early phases of projects places increased 
pressure on the FWS and the NMFS and individuals in those agen-
cies,228 to approve the projects.229 The FWS and the NMFS are not 
immune from political pressures and may authorize or support politi-
cally expedient, though illegal, projects.230 The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Washington in Seattle Audubon 
Society v. Evans even noted that there has been "a deliberate and 
227 See Williams, supra note 60, at 137 n.68. 
228 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A 
Theory and Short History of Environmental Laws, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 981, 991 (1994) 
[hereinafter Plater, From the Beginning] (noting employees within the Forest Service have 
been fired, demoted, transferred, or suffered similar reprisals for failing to tailor data to fit 
official needs). In a case involving the University of Arizona's desire to build a multi-million 
dollar observatory on Mount Graham, home of the endangered Mount Graham Red Squirrel, 
"two biologists working on the biological opinion indicated that the Fish and Wildlife report 
used to obtain the rider [which proclaimed the project to have satisfied the requirements of the 
ESA and NEPA] was suspect because the conclusion of the study may have been 'preordained.'" 
Sher & Hunting, supra note 6, at 450 (quoting Mountain Graham Red Squirrel v. Yeutter, No. 
89--410-GLO-ACM (D. Ariz. May 2, 1990». 
229 See Scott Allen, Judge Gives Go Ahead to Sewage Pipe; Tunnel to Aid Harbor Cleanup, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 27, 1993 (Metro/Region), at 1 (noting that when the NMFS writes the 
Biological Opinion relating to the outfall tunnel project the NMFS "will be under political 
pressure to let the outfall tunnel continue"). 
230 See, e.g., Dale D. Goble, Of Wolves and Welfare Ranching, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 101, 
125-26 (1992) (showing several violations by the FWS and the NMFS of the ESA and concluding 
that these agencies often succumb to political expediency, noting specifically the NMFS's deci-
sion to list the Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon run as threatened rather than endangered 
despite the fact that less than 100 wild fish returned to spawn in 1990); R.D. Peltz & J. Weinman, 
NEPA Threshold Determinations: A Framework of Analysis, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 71, 89 
(1976) ("[A]gencies often become carried away with their own abilities and defiantly refuse to 
comply with laws which they feel might hinder their operation. They may seek to insulate 
themselves from the law and judicial scrutiny, hiding behind the shield of expertise and self-
proclaimed autonomy."); Steiger, supra note 110, at 357 n.75 (noting lapse of Service's objectivity 
during the Reagan-Bush era); Williams, supra note 60, at 130 (noting that the EPA and the 
NMFS waited until public concern literally forced the EPA to enter into consultation with the 
NMFS to assess the impact of the sewage outfall tunnel on endangered right whales); see also 
Warren E. Leary, Interior Secretary Questions Law on Endangered Species, N.Y. TIMES, May 
12, 1990 § 1, at 8 (quoting Manuel Lujan, Secretary of the Interior, stating, "[d]o we have to 
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systematic refusal by the Forest Service and the FWS to comply with 
laws protecting wildlife."231 Likewise, in Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 
the FWS decided not to list the spotted owl as endangered despite 
overwhelming evidence that the owl qualified for listing.232 There, the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington 
found that, 
the Service disregarded all the expert opinion on population vi-
ability, including that of its own expert, that the owl is facing 
extinction, and instead merely asserted its expertise in support of 
its conclusions. 
The Service has failed to provide its own or other expert analy-
sis supporting its conclusions .... Accordingly, the ... decision 
not to list at this time the northern spotted owl as endangered or 
threatened under the Endangered Species Act was arbitrary and 
contrary to law.233 
The conversion of agencies from their statutory role as protector 
of wildlife to a role of complicity with those threatening wildlife is 
another result of sunk costs. When faced with pressure from indus-
tries which have invested heavily in a project, agencies often have no 
freedom to modify a project in the interest of environmental protec-
tion or to reject it outright. Thus Congress's purpose in mandating 
consultation in the ESA is completely undermined. 
Ignoring § 7(d) and the sunk costs problem eviscerates the entire 
consultation process. If courts are unwilling to prohibit irreversible 
and irretrievable commitments of resources, courts may as well stop 
enforcing the consultation provision as well. The ultimate results in 
save every subspecies? The red squirrel is the best example. Nobody's told me the difference 
between a red squirrel, a black one or a brown one."). 
The pressure that private parties place on agencies also contributes to the effectiveness of 
sunk costs. See, e.g., Saving a Seabird, DAILY CAMERA, March 6,1995 (Environment) at 1. The 
Pacific Lumber Company wanted to conceal that endangered marbled murrelets were in a grove 
which the timber company wanted to cut down. As a result the company "conducted biased and 
unreliable surveys, tried to pressure surveyors into changing their findings and altered reports 
before turning them over to the state." Id. 
231 Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1090 (W.D. Wash.), afl'd, 952 F.2d 297 
(9th Cir. 1991). The court concluded, "The problem here has not been any shortcoming in the 
laws, but simply a refusal of administrative agencies to comply with them." Id. at 1096; Chris-
topher A. Cole, Note, Species Conservation in the United States: The Ultimate Failure of the 
Endangered Species Act and Other Land Use Laws, 72 B.D. L. REV. 343, 362 (1992) (noting the 
FWS has, in many cases, bowed to political pressures by allowing harmful secondary uses to 
continue on refuge lands). 
232 Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988). 
233 Id.; see also Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 627-28 (W.D. Wash. 1991) 
(chastising the FWS's decision not to designate critical habitat for the spotted owl). 
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situations such as those involving the Tellico Dam,234 the Grayrocks 
Dam235 and the outfall pipe in Bays' Legal Fund,236 are testament to 
the ineffectiveness of consultation after an agency or developer has 
made significant commitments of resources to a project. Only by 
courts strictly enforcing the preclusion against sunk costs codified in 
§ 7(d), will the consultation process continue to have substantive mean-
ing in the future. 
Congress saw the consultation process as the most effective way of 
ensuring that federal actions did not jeopardize endangered species.237 
Working with the FWS or the NMFS during the early stages of a 
project often resolves any conflict between a project and an endan-
gered species.238 Preventing all significant commitments of resources 
until consultation is complete not only protects endangered species, 
it also serves the best interest of the project as well. If meaningful 
consultation occurs early on, the ESA will stop only those few projects 
that have absolutely no design alternatives or that are so detrimental 
to an endangered species that they cannot be completed without 
jeopardizing the species.239 
234 See supra notes 3-6. 
235 See supra note 54. 
236 See supra notes 55-64. 
237 H.R. REP. 1625, supra note 10, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 6, at 736 
(Congress recognizing "that in many instances good faith consultation between the acting 
agency and the Fish and Wildlife Service can resolve many endangered species conflicts"). 
238 See Steiger, supra note 110, at 259 (citing several studies of projects which indicate 
effectiveness in identifying alternatives to avoiding completely abandoning a proposed project). 
Steiger reveals that a 1992 General Accounting Office (GAO) study of consultations during 
1987-91 found that over 90% of all formal consultations resulted in a no-jeopardy opinion, and 
that 90% of all projects for which a jeopardy opinion had been issued were allowed to go forward 
after the project sponsor adopted the Service's suggested alternatives. See id. at 259 n.86 (citing 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-92-131BR, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TYPES 
AND NUMBER OF IMPLEMENTING ACTIONS 16 (1992»; see also Douglas H. Chadwick, Dead or 
Alive: The Endangered Species Act, 187 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC No.3 (March 1995) at 2,15 
(noting that out of 98,237 interagency consultations between 1987 and 1992, just 55 projects 
were stopped completely). 
239 See Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementation by the U.S. 
Department of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 320 (1993) (noting 1993 study 
of 99 biological opinions issued between 1988 and 1992 and concluding that "no major public 
activity, nor any major federally-permitted private activity was blocked"); Steiger, supra note 
110, at 259-60 & n.87 (citing WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, FOR CONSERVING LISTED SPECIES, 
TALK IS CHEAPER THAN WE THINK: THE CONSULTATION PROCESS UNDER THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT III (1992), which found that less than one percent of all agency activities subject 
to formal consultation between 1987 and 1991 were stopped for § 7 reasons); Terry Tang, A 
Grossly Warped Picture of Endangered Species Act, SEATTLE TIMES, June 21, 1995 (Opinion) 
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C. Public Participation in Decision-Making Process is Curtailed 
Project proponents use sunk costs to undermine the effectiveness 
of public opposition to controversial projects.240 The farther along a 
project has proceeded, the more difficulty the public faces in organiz-
ing opposition to the project.241 One commentator has described a 
symptom of sunk costs as the "nibbling phenomenon," in which the 
environmental quality of a region is destroyed gradually by a series 
of minor decisions.242 The damage caused by each individual decision 
may not arouse sufficient public concern to support effective opposi-
tion, thus allowing the project to proceed so far along as to be virtually 
impossible to stop.243 
Barriers to public opposition are especially troubling because citi-
zen suits are the primary means of enforcement for many environ-
mental statutes, a fact not lost on regulated industries.244 For example, 
at B6 (noting that out of 73,600 instances between 1987 and 1991 where federal government 
action potentially put a listed species in jeopardy, only 19 projects were blocked or canceled). 
240 See SAX, supra note 1, at 103. Professor Sax recalls the tactics of oil companies at Santa 
Barbara to invest significant sums into oil exploration before public opposition could be heard. 
See id. Professor Sax notes, that "[i]n the planning for offshore oil drilling ... the oil companies 
made much of the fact that by the time citizens began to complain, they had already invested 
millions of dollars in exploratory work and that it was by then too late to begin reexamining 
the proposal to drill." Id. (emphasis in original). A chemical company applied similar tactics in 
South Carolina, quietly obtaining the approval of South Carolina officials for its chemical plant, 
before public opposition to the project materialized. See id. 
241 See Kim Herman Goslant, Citizen Participation and Administrative Discretion in the 
Cleanup of Naragansett Bay, 12 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 527 (1988) (noting federal agencies 
deliberately minimize public awareness of decisions to ensure that their actions are not dis-
rupted); see also Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values and Judicial Review after Lujan: 
Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOL. L.Q. 335, 366 n.207 
(1991) ("[A]dministrators often allow money to be spent on projects prior to public review 
because sunk costs diminish public opposition to the project.") (citing Goslant, supra note 62, at 
527); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 496-97 (1970) (discussing how a government project which 
quietly proceeds "will approach the point of irreversibility before those who would question it 
can initiate their questioning"). 
242 SAX, supra note 1, at 55-56. 
243 See David Berschauer, Is the "Endangered Species Act" Endangered?, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 
991,1014--15 (1992). Berschauer presents an example of the "nibbling phenomenon" in Southern 
California where "developers are slowly cutting some of the last viable riparian habitat, coastal 
sage scrub, chaparral, and oak woodlands in Southern California into small 'islands' incapable 
of supporting native plants and animals, many of which are endangered and threatened species." 
Id. 
244 See Plater, From the Beginning, supra note 228, at 992. Professor Plater notes a general 
acknowledgment by Congress, government agencies, and private interests that citizen enforce-
ment of environmental statutes are required to effectively enforce the law. Id. at 983-94. 
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the timber industry's successful efforts to prevent citizen groups from 
interfering with logging operations by suing to enforce environmental 
laws, exemplifies the important role citizens play in the enforcement 
of this nation's environmental laws.245 As Professor Zygmunt Plater 
noted, "[t]he timber lobbyists and their congressional spokespersons 
realized ... that they did not have to repeal the statutes in order to 
nullify the existing protective laws. All they had to do was block 
citizen enforcement actions."246 Similarly, sunk costs make enforce-
ment of the ESA less likely because the effectiveness of citizen en-
forcement of the ESA becomes increasingly marginalized the farther 
along the project proceeds.247 
Judge Breyer, in Sears Island, noted that federal decision makers 
should know the public's concerns about a project before the fed-
eral government commits to pursuing any course of action that sig-
nificantly affects the environment.248 Allowing sunk costs to be in-
curred prior to public comment eviscerates the seriousness with which 
the public's concerns can be alleviated by subsequent modifications to 
a project. Thus, by eliminating public comment, sunk costs undermine 
the democratic, decision-making process mandated in our environ-
mental statutes.249 Instead, because of sunk costs, these decisions can 
be usurped by special interest groups with the money, power, and 
influence to invest significant funds into projects before the public can 
react.250 
245 See 1990 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 
No. 101-121, § 318(g), 103 Stat. 701, 749 (1989) (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.) (containing 
rider precluding citizen enforcement of environmental statutes which would interfere with 
logging operations); see also Plater, From the Beginning, supra note 228, at 984, 992. 
Riders attached to appropriations bills exempting logging from environmental laws such as 
the ESA and NEPA continue. President Clinton has signed a budget rescissions act which 
contained a rider suspending enforcement of environmental laws such as NEPA and the ESA 
for massive logging programs on public lands. See Salvage Timber Sale Program, Pub. L. No. 
104-19,109 Stat. 240. (July 22,1995); see also Timothy Egan, As Clear-Cutting Returns, Motives 
Are Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1995, at A16 ("The timber industry bought Congress and 
in essence got them to remove all citizens' rights, barring them from the courthouse door.") 
(statement of Tim Hermach of the Native Forest Council in Oregon referring to Pub. L. 104-19). 
246 See Plater, From the Beginning, supra note 228, at 992. 
247 See supra note 240. 
248 See Sears Island, 872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1989). 
249 Most environmental statutes require public notice and allow for public comment before an 
agency decision is finalized. See, e.g., ESA § 4(f)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(4) (requiring the Secre-
tary to "consider all information presented during the public comment period prior to the 
approval of [any recovery plan for an endangered or threatened species]"). 
250 See supra note 240. An excellent example of a community organizing to confront a power 
company's use of sunk costs to justify relicensing a dam with few economic benefits, but a 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The longer a project proceeds, the more likely the project's momen-
tum will preclude objective analysis of economic, environmental, and 
social costs. Both public and private developers take advantage of this 
momentum before communities or conservation organizations realize 
what the long-term implications of the project may be. Countless 
ill-conceived, yet finished federal projects stand as testament to the 
power of the sunk cost tactic. U ntH courts uniformly recognize the 
dangers of sunk costs and strictly enforce § 7(d), sunk costs will 
continue to be an effective strategy employed by both public and 
private developers intent on bypassing environmental regulation. 
The legislature has condemned the use of sunk costs to bypass 
environmental regulation. Judicial responses to § 7(d), as well as to 
other statutory schemes prohibiting sunk costs, reveal that few courts 
fully comprehend the pervasiveness of the sunk cost tactic or recog-
nize the insidious effects sunk costs have in undermining environ-
mental laws. Section 7(d)'s preclusion of irreversible and irretrievable 
commitments of resources is an unambiguous mandate from Congress 
not to let sunk costs be used to withdraw the environmental decision-
making process from the public. During a time when the public's input 
in environmental decisions is becoming increasingly marginalized by 
the influence of private industry, it is especially crucial that the pur-
pose of § 7(d) not be ignored. Congress has acted. The courts must 
now make the sunk cost tactic a thing of the past, rather than allow 
the strategy to continue to be business as usual. 
significant ecological impact, is demonstrated by the controversy surrounding the Clyde River 
in Vermont. See generally, John Dillon, Heroes oftke Clyde: How TU Activists Are Bringing 
Vermont:S Clyde River Back to Life, TROUT, Summer 1995, at 14. When a dam on the Clyde 
River virtually was washed away by a flood, the power company that owned the dam immedi-
ately reconstructed a significant part of the dam under the guise that it "was merely stabilizing 
the clay bank that had eroded ... ," in violation of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 52. By the time 
concerned citizens groups and the EPA were able to obtain an injunction ordering the power 
company to stop working on the dam, most of the work was complete. Id. 
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